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ASSESSING CONSENSUS:
THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
CARY COGLIANESEt
Negotiated rulemaking appears by most accounts to have
come of age. A procedure that once seemed confined to discussion
among administrative law scholars has in the past decade captured
the attention of policymakers throughout the nation's capital. Con-
gress officially endorsed regulatory negotiation in the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990,' and it permanently reauthorized the
Act in 1996.2 Over the past few years, the executive branch has
visibly supported regulatory negotiation, both through the Clinton
administration's National Performance Review (NPR)3 and
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3. See OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATION-
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through specific presidential directives to agency heads.4 Congress
has also begun to mandate the use of negotiated rulemaking by
certain agencies in the development of specific regulations.5 As a
result of these and other efforts, federal agencies have begun to
employ the consensus-based process known as negotiated
rulemaking.6
Negotiated rulemaking supplements the notice-and-comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 with a
negotiation process that takes place before an agency issues a pro-
posed regulation. The agency establishes a committee comprised of
AL PERFORMANCE REVIEW: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 32 (1993) [hereinafter
IMPROViNoG REGULATORY SYSTEMS].
4. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642-43 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994); Memorandum for Executive Departments and Selected Agencies [and the]
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,391
(1993) [hereinafter President's Negotiated Rulemaking Memorandum].
5. Some recent bills introduced in Congress would require specific agencies to use
negotiated rulemaking in developing regulations. See, e.g., Intermodal Transportation Safe-
ty Act of 1997, S. 1267, 105th Cong. § 521 (requiring the establishment of a motor vehi-
cle safety advisory committee to assist in negotiated rulemaking); Tribal Self-Governance
Amendments of 1997, H.R. 1833, 105th Cong. § 517 (requiring negotiated rulemaking
with Indian Tribes); Public Housing Reform and Responsibility Act of 1997, S. 462, 105th
Cong. 99 106(b)(2), 110(b)(1), 208 (requiring use of negotiated rulemaking to implement
various legislative provisions). For a list of statutes requiring the use of negotiated
rulemaking, see infra note 75. One of the more salient legislative debates over a mandate
for negotiated rulemaking occurred in June of 1995 when Congress turned its attention to
new meat safety standards to be issued by the Department of Agriculture. Secretary of
Agriculture Dan Glickman successfully resisted congressional efforts to compel the use of
a formal negotiated rulemaking process for these regulations, agreeing instead to hold a
series of informal meetings with affected parties. See Accord is Reached on Meat Safety
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at Bh; Compromise Reached on USDA's HACCP Rule'
Walsh to Withdraw Amendment, BNA WASH. INSIDER, July 20, 1995, at D10.
6. Negotiated rulemaking is defined by statute to mean "rulemaking through the use
of a negotiated rulemaking committee[,]" and such a committee is in turn defined as "an
advisory committee established by an agency . . . to consider and discuss issues for the
purpose of reaching a consensus in the development of a proposed rule." 5 U.S.C. § 562
(1994 & Supp. I 1995). In this Article, I sometimes use the term "negotiated rulemaking"
interchangeably with "regulatory negotiation" (reg neg), even though regulatory negotia-
tion actually connotes a broader range of methods used by agencies for soliciting public
input. Such other methods can include public hearings, one-time workshops, occasional
roundtables, and established advisory committees. What distinguishes these forms of pub-
lic participation from the formal negotiated rulemaking process is the explicit quest in
negotiated rulemaking for "reaching a consensus [among the participants] in the develop-
ment of a proposed rule." Id. Thus, in seeking to assess consensus, as the title of this
Article suggests, I am focusing only. on the most extreme form of public participation,
which seeks to achieve not merely the input and support of outside parties, but the
achievement of a consensus among them.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
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representatives from regulated firms, trade associations, citizen
groups, and other affected organizations, as well as members of
the agency staff.' The committee meets publicly to negotiate a
proposed rule.9 If the committee reaches consensus,'0 the agency
typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then
proceeds according to the notice-and-comment procedures speci-
fied in the APA." Proponents of negotiated rulemaking claim
that these procedures-which encourage affected parties to reach
an agreement at the outset-will decrease the amount of time it
takes to develop regulations 2 and, more notably, reduce or elimi-
nate subsequent judicial challenges.'
Does negotiated rulemaking achieve its instrumental goals for
federal agencies, such as those of saving time and reducing litiga-
tion? Many seem convinced that it does. In legislative hearings
leading up to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Senator
8. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 564-565 (1994).
9. Negotiated rulemaking committees must generally meet the applicable require-
ments for advisory committees, see id. § 565(a)(1), one of which is the Federal Advisory
Committee Act's requirement that meetings be open to the public. See 5 U.S.C. app. §
10(a)(1) (Supp. I 1995).
10. By statute, "consensus" is defined as unanimous concurrence or any lesser con-
currence if agreed to unanimously by the committee. See 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (1994).
11. These procedures include publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking, an op-
portunity for the interested persons to comment on the rule, and a statement of the
basis and purpose of the final rule. See id § 553. For an overview of notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking, see James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law
and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979).
12. See, eg., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo.
LJ. 1, 30 (1982) (asserting that negotiated rulemaking "can reduce the time and cost of
developing regulations"); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., BUILDING CON-
SENSUS IN AGENCY RULEMAKING: IMPLEMENTING THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT
1 (1995) [hereinafter ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS] ("reg-neg can improve the quality,
acceptability and timeliness of regulations"); Conference, Harvard Electricity Policy Group:
Regulatory Decisionmaking Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 789, 875 (1995) (statement by Michael
Asimow that "negotiated rulemaking is an exceptionally promising technique to speed up
the rulemaking process and achieve consensus").
13. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 202 (Paul C. Stem & Harvey V. Fineberg eds.,
1996) ("The purpose of regulatory negotiation is to reduce legal challenges to new rules
by involving would-be adversaries directly in the rule-making process and by producing a
draft rule that meets legal requirements and is acceptable to a wide array of interested
and affected parties."); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New
Role for the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 18 (1985) (noting that advocates of
negotiated rulemaking claim this procedure will "soften the adversary posture that ani-
mates the current comment process and reduce the inevitability of legal challenges to
adopted rules"). See also infra notes 29-31, 39-57, 60-61, 87 and accompanying text.
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Carl Levin remarked that while in the initial years "there was
little evidence that [the] potential benefits of negotiated
rulemaking would actually accrue," negotiated rulemaking now has
"a track record of success."'14 The NPR staff more recently urged
others to follow the lead of those "federal agencies [that] have
successfully pioneered a consensus-based approach to drafting
regulations."' 5 The authors of the NPR report concluded that at
least at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "regulatory
negotiations, on average, take less time than other rulemakings"
and have resulted in a significant decline in the rate of judicial
challenges. 6
Such claims notwithstanding, the instrumental value of negoti-
ated rulemaking has more often been asserted than demonstrated.
The reported literature on negotiated rulemaking consists largely
of descriptive case studies (sometimes authored by participants
themselves) and of prescriptive accounts espousing the theoretical
advantages of negotiated rulemaking. 7 Yet as the author of a
14. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 3052 Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 31 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3052] (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). Sen-
ator Levin has long supported negotiated rulemaking, sponsoring among the earliest
pieces of legislation to support the process, the Regulatory Negotiation Act of 1980, S.
3126, 96th Cong., 126 CONG. REC. 26,074-76 (1980), as well as the most recent, the Ad-
ministrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1995, S. 1224, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REC.
S12,961 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1995).
15. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 29.
16. Id. at 31. The promise of negotiated rulemaking has led one administrative law
scholar to embrace the procedure as "the policymaking idea of the 21st Century." Con-
ference, supra note 12, at 875 (statement of Michael Asimow).
17. See, eg., Neil Eisner, Regulatory Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 371 (1984) (prescriptive lessons based on Federal Aviation Administration
flight and duty rulemaking); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal
Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 74 GEO. LJ. 1625 (1986) (conceptual framework based on negotiated rulemakings
at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Federal Aviation Administration,
and EPA); D. Michael Rappoport & John F. Cooney, Visibility at the Grand Canyon:
Regulatory Negotiations Under the Clean Air Act, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 627 (1992) (case
study of EPA negotiated rulemaking); Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical
Perspective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,647 (Oct. 1992) (prescriptive lessons
drawing on author's experience in negotiated rulemaking); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard
McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133
(1985) (examination of two EPA negotiated rulemakings). Barry Rabe has observed that
most of what we know about the use of consensus-building techniques in the regulatory
process has been produced by those individuals already strongly predisposed to its value.
See Barry G. Rabe, The Politics of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 16 POL'VY STUD. J.
585, 591 (1988). The most detailed case study of the negotiated rulemaking process by an
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leading text on rulemaking has observed, "[t]he purported superi-
ority of consensual processes over decisionmaking techniques that
employ methods outlined in the APA... cannot be established
by mere positing of generalities and abstractions.""8 Negotiated
rulemaking has long lacked systematic evidence showing that it
yields superior results over conventional rulemaking. Consequently,
while both Congress and the President have been urging federal
agencies to initiate more negotiated rulemakings, scholars have
been acknowledging that the impact of regulatory negotiation re-
mains an open empirical question. 9 Even one of negotiated
rulemaking's biggest institutional supporters, the now-defunct Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), noted in
one of its final reports that "[t]here has been little formal evalua-
tion of the use of negotiated rulemaking."
In an effort to fill this void, this Article presents an empirical
assessment of the impact of negotiated rulemaking on two of its
principal goals: reducing overall rulemaking time and decreasing
the number of judicial challenges to agency rules.2 ' Unlike other
outside observer is Christine B. Harrington, Howard Bellman. Using "Bundles of Input"
to Negotiate an Environmental Dispute, in DEBORAH M. KOLB ET AL, WHEN TALK
WORKS 105 (1994) (detailing negotiation process in Nuclear Regulatory Commission
rulemaking).
18. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Assessing the Effects of Consensual Processes in Regulatory
Programs: Methodological and Policy Issues, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 401, 409 (1983). But see
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY 190 (1994) (noting that "[n]egotiated rulemaking is now a mature concept
with a considerable, and largely positive, track record in the development of rules").
19. See, e.g., Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem & Irene Lamb, Negotiation and Mediation in
the Public Sector-The German Experience, PUB. ADMIN. 309, 325 (1994) (noting that the
benefits of mediation in the public sector remain an "open issue"); Rosemary O'Leary,
Environmental Mediation: What Do We Know and How Do We Know It?, in MEDIATING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17, 32 (J. Walton Blackburn &
Willa Marie Bruce eds., 1995) (observing that more research is needed on public negotia-
tion and mediation); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical
Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE LJ. 1206, 1212 (1994) (suggesting that wide-
spread benefits of negotiated rulemaking are largely speculative).
20. ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 28. If negotiated rulemaking
were costless, it might well be fine to forego the challenges inherent in conducting a
systematic evaluation. But negotiated rulemaking does demand much time and effort on
the part of federal agencies as well as nongovernmental actors. See infra notes 127-31,
317 and accompanying text. A systematic evaluation of the main goals of negotiated
rulemaking can therefore help guide agency decisions about how to structure rulemaking
proceedings. Such an evaluation is also consistent with the principles underlying the Gov-
ernment Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.) (designed to promote the evalu-
ation of the results of governmental programs).
21. By limiting my focus to these two primary goals, I do not necessarily endorse
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research, my analysis considers the use of regulatory negotiation
by all federal agencies over the past thirteen years. Like others, I
too give special attention to rulemaking at the EPA because it has
pursued by far the most negotiated rulemakings and it has been
the focus of many of the claims about the purported success of
the negotiated process.
In Part I, I review the development of negotiated rulemaking
over the past decade and a half, giving close attention to the
previously unexamined legislative history underlying the Negotiat-
ed Rulemaking Act of 1990. My review shows that the chief goals
of negotiated rulemaking have been to reduce both rulemaking
time and the filing of petitions for judicial review. In Part II, I
report on the extent to which federal agencies have used negotiat-
them as the only measures for evaluating negotiated rulemaking or any other rulemaking
process. There may well be other relevant instrumental goals, such as information ex-
change or increased compliance, however difficult they may be to measure. Moreover,
notwithstanding the apparent litigation anxiety reflected in much of the literature on
negotiated rulemaking, the fact that someone files a petition for review does not mean
that the regulatory process was for that reason alone a failure nor even that the process
was necessarily all that contentious. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships:
Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & Soc'Y REV. 735, 758-62
(1996) (explaining the compatibility of litigation with ongoing, cooperative relationships in
the regulatory process). My purpose in this Article is simply to assess negotiated
rulemaking on its own terms, using the standards that have been set for it by those
legislators, agency officials, practitioners, and scholars who have advocated its use over
the years. The goals of saving time and reducing litigation are by far the most prominent
ones invoked in the literature and the legislative history. See supra notes 12-13 and infra
notes 39-61, 82-86 and accompanying text. Of course, the extent to which negotiated
rulemaking does or does not achieve its instrumental goals should be understood as rele-
vant to but not dispositive of any assessment of negotiated rulemaking from the stand-
point of democratic or constitutional theory. Even if negotiated rulemaking reduced time
and litigation substantially, we still might reject it for reasons related to representation
and governmental accountability. See eg., THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERAL-
isM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979) (arguing against
legislative delegation of policymaking authority); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Set-
tlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984) (arguing against decentralized decision-making in the
litigation process); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Reg-Neg and the Pub-
lic Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENvTL. L. 55, 96-98 (1987) (arguing that
regulatory negotiation tends to subvert the administrative search for the public interest);
Christine B. Harrington, Regulatory Reform: Creating Gaps and Making Markets, 10 LAW
& POL'Y 293 (1988) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking shifts relationships between the
state and regulated interests). But see Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judi-
cial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 471, 489 (1983) (arguing that con-
sensual rulemaking can enhance the legitimacy of regulation); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation" Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORO.
81, 99 (1985) (arguing that delegation of policymaking to administrative agencies can
make government more responsive to the public).
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ed rulemaking and the outcomes they have achieved in terms of
the two main goals of timeliness and reduced litigation. My find-
ings run counter to the prevailing consensus in favor of negotiated
rulemaking and draw into question the continued value of formal
negotiated rulemaking. Despite all the postulations about how
negotiated rulemaking will save time and eliminate litigation, the
procedure so far has not proven itself superior to the informal
rulemaking that agencies ordinarily use. In Part Ill, I anticipate
and respond to potential criticisms of my analysis and conclude
that it is time to reassess the value of full-scale negotiated
rulemaking in light of its surprisingly weak track record.
I. THE PROMISE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Proponents have promised many benefits from negotiated
rulemaking, but chief among them have been the procedure's
ability to develop regulations more quickly and with less resulting
litigation. In order to understand these principal goals of negotiat-
ed rulemaking, it is helpful to turn to the history leading up to
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 and subsequent initiatives
to expand the use of regulatory negotiation.
The idea of involving affected parties in executive branch
policymaking dates back at least to the New Deal,2 and the idea
has returned with renewed vigor in the past twenty years. In the
mid-1970s, Secretary of Labor John Dunlop proposed that the
parties most affected by federal regulations should play a greater
role in the development of those same regulations.' Dunlop
22. As early as 1919, the Federal Trade Commission employed a negotiated process
first called "trade practice submittals" and later referred to as "trade practice conferenc-
es." See Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Beth Martin, FTC Rulemaking Through Negotiation, 61
N.C. L. REV. 275, 294 (1983). As part of the New Deal, the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (NIRA) delegated authority to the President to give legal force to codes adopted
by industrial associations. See 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933). Although the Supreme Court held
that NIRA amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the Court did
acknowledge that the statute arose from a perceived need to foster cooperation by "per-
mitting [regulated industry] to initiate the adoption of codes." A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
also provided for procedures similar to regulatory negotiation by requiring wage orders to
be developed through committees composed of employer and employee representatives.
See Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 5, 8, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, 1064-65 (1938).
23. See John T. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67 (1976)
(urging agencies to engage in direct discussion with affected parties in developing regula-
tions); see also John T. Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 29
ViLL. L. REv. 1421 (1983-84) (arguing that negotiation promises important benefits for
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chaired the opening meeting of the National Coal Policy Project in
the late 1970s, one of the most prominent early experiments with
negotiation over regulatory policy.24 The National Coal Policy
Project sought the consensus of environmental groups and industry
on policies related to increased coal production, and achieved
agreement on several hundred proposals. 5 Although most of
these proposals were never ultimately enacted, the Project did
serve as a model for negotiated rulemaking by demonstrating that
consensus could be built across conflicting groups of interests.
Negotiated rulemaking was introduced more prominently in
the early 1980s as a way of curing a "malaise" that some thought
characterized federal rulemaking practice at the time.2 6 This mal-
aise was attributed to the time and expense of rulemaking, as well
as the amount of conflict and litigation over agency rules. Accord-
ing to Philip Harter's 1982 report to ACUS on negotiated
rulemaking, the process of negotiating rules could reduce conflict,
improve the exchange of information, decrease the length and cost
of rulemaking, and overall lead to more effective and legitimate
regulations.27 Proponents alleged that if used in appropriate cases,
negotiated rulemaking "should eliminate major controversy during
the period after publication of the notice, unlike the hybrid
rulemaking process in which the notice is an invitation to fight. ') 28
One of the most cited reasons for using negotiation has been
its potential to ward-off judicial review challenges. 29 Intuitively,
the settlement of regulatory and legal disputes).
24. For the most extensive study of the National Coal Policy Project, see generally
ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, COOPERATIVE PLURALISM: THE NATIONAL COAL POLICY Ex-
PERMENT (1993).
25. See id. at 1.
26. See Harter, supra note 12, at 113 (arguing that negotiated rulemaking can help
cure "[t]he malaise of administrative law"); Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation
or Negotiation?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1981, at 82 (asserting that public negotia-
tion can reduce conflict and controversy in the regulatory process); Peter H. Schuck,
Litigation, Bargaining, and Regulation, REGULATION, July-August 1979, at 26 (arguing
that direct negotiation can offset the "chronic fractiousness" of U.S. policymaking).
27. See Harter, supra note 12, at 28-31.
28. Id. at 101.
29. See Cynthia Croce, Negotiation Instead of Confrontation, EPA J., Apr. 1985, at
23, 23; D.V. Feliciano, Negotiating Regulations: Let's Negotiate, Not Litigate, 10 CURRENT
MUN. PROBS. 217, 222 (1983-84); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National
Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165, 1171
(1994); William H. Miller, Bypassing the Lawyers: "Regulatory Negotiation" Gets Test in
Agencies, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 23, 1986, at 20; David M. Pritzker, Working Together
for Better Regulations, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 29, 51 (1990); Lawrence Susskind &
1262 [Vol. 46:1255
ASSESSING CONSENSUS 1263
rules developed through a process that seeks the consensus of
affected parties at the outset would seem less likely to generate
subsequent conflict and litigation.0 By seeking to resolve conflicts
through a quest for a negotiated agreement, the agency in theory
is supposed to save time during the rulemaking process as well as
afterwards by avoiding litigation.3'
In response to Philip Harter's report, ACUS recommended
that agencies use the negotiated rulemaking process.32 In 1983,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initiated the first
formal negotiated rulemaking.33 A few other agencies followed
the FAA in experimenting with the alternative procedure, most
prominently the EPA. Although these early attempts at negotia-
tion were generally considered valuable experiences, by 1990 only
five federal agencies had promulgated rules using negotiated
rulemaking.34 Even though the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA)31 effectively authorized agencies to establish committees
Laura VanDam, Squaring Off at the Table, Not in the Courts, 89 TECH. REV. 36, 72
(1986); Lee M. Thomas, The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiation by EPA, ADMIN.
L. NEws, Fall 1987, at 1, 3.
30. Sometimes the parties to the negotiation even explicitly agree not to file a legal
challenge if the final rule is consistent with the consensus reached in the negotiations.
See, e.g., AGREEMENT OF EPA NEGOTIATING COMMITrEE FOR NEW SOURCE PERFOR-
MANCE STANDARD FOR RESIDENTIAL WOOD HEATERS 5 (1986), reprinted in ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 240 (Da-
vid M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1995) [hereinafter 1995 SOURCEBOOK] ("Each
party other than EPA agrees not to challenge the final rule in court if the final rule and
its preamble are consistent with the recommended -proposed rule.").
31. See, eg., Harter, supra note 12, at 59 (arguing that regulatory negotiation can
head off the "wrangling and disputes" that make "regulations take an enormously long
time to become effective," and that it can "provide a forum for more direct reconcilia-
tion of [regulatory] disputes in a less time consuming fashion").
32. See Administrative Conference of the U.S., Recommendation No. 82-4, Proce-
dures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4, 1 (1993) [hereinafter
ACUS Recommendation No. 82-4] reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 11;
Administrative Conference of the U.S., Recommendation No. 85-5, Procedures for Nego-
tiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1993) [hereinafter ACUS Recommen-
dation No. 85-5] reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 15.
33. See Flight Time, Duty Time, & Rest Requirements for Flight Crewmembers, 48
Fed. Reg. 21,339, 21,340 (1983).
34. The five agencies were the Department of Education, Department of Labor, De-
partment of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Three other agencies-the Department of Agriculture, Department of Interi-
or, and Federal Trade Commission-had initiated negotiated rulemaking proceedings but
had yet to issue final rules following these negotiations.
35. 5 U.S.C. app. (1994).
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to negotiate rules,36 agencies were thought reluctant to proceed in
the absence of clear congressional guidance specifically approving
negotiated rulemaking committees.37
As early as 1980, members of Congress began introducing
legislation to encourage the use of negotiated rulemaking. 8 Even
during these early years of Congressional consideration, advocates
portrayed negotiated rulemaking as a means of reducing regulatory
delays and avoiding judicial challenges. In joint congressional hear-
ings on negotiated rulemaking in 1980, members of Congress sin-
gled out judicial challenges of federal regulations as a pressing
problem. Senator Gaylord Nelson observed that federal regulations
frequently ended up in court, prolonging the rulemaking process
and increasing agency costs.39 Several other participants in the
hearings, including Senator Carl Levin,' EPA Deputy Assistant
Administrator Roy Gamse,4' and industry representatives Harri-
son Loesch a and M. Kendall Fleeharty,43 warned of the growing
resort to judicial review and the mounting costs of litigation.
Several years later, in a congressional hearing on the Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Act of 1987, Representative Don Pease observed
that "administrative regulations often become the object of pro-
tracted litigation."" A leading sponsor of negotiated rulemaking
legislation, Pease invoked a statistic that to this day continues to
be cited to illustrate the need for negotiated rulemaking. "For
example," Pease said, "roughly 80 percent of the 300 regulations
issued each year by the Environmental Protection Agency end up
in court.... For now, I would simply state that the Federal Gov-
ernment ought to be doing what it can to reduce unnecessary and
36. Id. app. §§ 1-5.
37. See ACUS Recommendation No. 85-5, supra note 32, reprinted in 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 15; Formation of Negotiated Rulemaking Committees,
134 CONG. REc 26,879, 26,881--82 (1988) (statement of Sen. Levin).
38. The 1982 ACUS recommendation formally called for legislation "explicitly autho-
rizing agencies to conduct rulemaking proceedings" using a negotiated process. See ACUS
Recommendation No. 82-4, supra note 32, reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30,
at 11.
39. See Regulatory Negotiation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on
Small Bus. and the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Management of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong. 2 (1980) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
40. See id. at 2-3.
41. See id- at 6-8.
42. See iL at 89.
43. See iL at 128.
44. Hearing on H.R. 3052, supra note 14, at 21 (statement of Rep. Pease).
1264 [Vol. 46:1255
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costly litigation."'45 In the same hearing on the 1987 bill, Senator
Carl Levin testified that negotiated rules would be less vulnerable
to challenge in court.4 6 In addition, the chairman of the Adminis-
trative Conference, Marshall Breger, testified that negotiated
rulemaking had arisen as a response to "the explosion in litigation
that has occurred in the last 20 years regarding the United States
Government's rules."'47 He, too, cited the 80 percent litigation
rate of EPA rules as evidence of the problem.'
In another hearing, Breger again testified that over three-
quarters of EPA's rules were challenged in court.49 Both he and
Representative Pease subsequently repeated their belief that regu-
latory negotiation would reduce the number of judicial challeng-
es.50 Thomas Kelly, the director of EPA's Office of Standards
and Regulations, testified that negotiated rulemaking would allow
agencies to escape what he termed a "'regulate, litigate, regulate,
litigate' syndrome."'" With testimony such as this, it was not sur-
prising that the report of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs on the 1989 legislation stated that negotiated rulemaking
would address "the poor quality of rules produced, the burden-
some nature of the rulemaking process, the length of time it takes
to promulgate rules, and the frequency of litigation that fol-
lows."52
In a similar vein, the House committee report on the Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Act of 1990 emphasized that negotiation would
head off judicial challenges to agency rules.53 The committee also
cited the 80 percent litigation rate for EPA rules and concluded
that negotiated rulemaking would reduce the volume of litiga-
tion.' During floor debate in the House, Representatives Pease
45. Id.
46. See id. at 28.
47. Id. at 35 (statement of Marshall L. Breger, chairman, ACUS).
48. See id.
49. See Regulation Through Negotiation: The Negotiated Rulemaking Act" Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. 6 (1988) [hereinafter Regu-
lation Through Negotiation] (statement of Marshall L. Breger, chairman, ACUS).
50. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 21,
23, 53 (1989).
51. Regulation Through Negotiation, supra note 49, at 8 (statement of Thomas Kelly,
Director of EPA Office of Standards and Regulations).
52. S. REP. No. 101-97, at 2 (1989).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 101-461, at 8-9 (1990).
54. See id. at 9, 17.
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and James indicated that reducing litigation was a major purpose
of the Act. Pease stated that "too often in the past, and currently,
rules are promulgated by agencies and then those groups that are
affected by the rule go into court and challenge it.""5 In contrast,
he argued, negotiated rulemaking "would, hopefully, avoid the liti-
gation which now costs a lot of money and also results in long,
protracted proceedings before the rule can finally go into ef-
fect. '5 6 James similarly claimed that negotiated rulemaking would
"encourage those parties who are most affected by the rules to try
to address the problems that the administrative rules create prior
to their being utilized in the administrative agencies which ulti-
mately leads to very expensive litigation."' 7
In the fall of 1990, Congress passed the Negotiated Rule-
making Act. 8 In adopting the Act, Congress found that
"[a]gencies currently use rulemaking procedures that may...
cause parties with different interests to assume conflicting and
antagonistic positions and to engage in expensive and time-con-
suming litigation over agency rules."59 Negotiated rulemaking,
Congress announced, "can increase the acceptability and improve
the substance of rules, making it less likely that the affected par-
ties will resist enforcement or challenge such rules in court. It may
also shorten the amount of time needed to issue final rules."'6
Upon signing the Act, President Bush affirmed that the legislation
would encourage negotiation "as a means of avoiding costly and
time-consuming litigation."'"
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 does not require
agencies to use formal negotiated procedures for rulemaking.
Rather, it authorizes a procedure through which an agency can
bring interested parties into the rulemaking process before it issues
a proposed rule. The procedure for negotiated rulemaking begins
with a determination by the head of the agency that a negotiated
process would be appropriate and consistent with the public inter-
55. 136 CONG. REC. H1855 (daily ed. May 1, 1990) (statement of Rep. Pease).
56. Id.
57. 136 CONG. REc H10,966-67 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. James).
58. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994)).
59. Id. § 2(2), 104 Stat. at 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 561 (1994)).
60. Id. § 2(5), 104 Stat. at 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 561 (1994)).
61. Statement on Signing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1716 (Nov. 29, 1990).
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est, based on several criteria listed in the Act.6' These criteria
include "a limited number of identifiable interests that will be
significantly affected by the rule,, 63 a "reasonable likelihood" that
representatives of such interests will negotiate in good faith,64 and
a "reasonable likelihood that a committee [of such representatives]
will reach a consensus ... within a fixed period of time."65
After the agency makes a determination that negotiated
rulemaking would be appropriate, the agency must publish a no-
tice in the Federal Register indicating its intent to establish a nego-
tiated rulemaking committee that will meet to reach a consensus
on a proposed rule.66 This notice needs to include, among other
things, a description of the subject of the rulemaking, a list of the
main interests likely to be affected by the rule, and a proposed list
of persons who will represent these interests on the committee.67
Interested parties have 30 days to submit comments on the notice
and to apply for a seat on the committee.68 The agency, after
considering any comments or applications submitted, may establish
a negotiated rulemaking committee if it still determines that one is
appropriate. The Act limits the size of the committee to 25 mem-
bers, "unless the agency head determines that a greater num-
ber ... is necessary for the functioning of the committee or to
achieve balanced membership. 69
Once constituted, the committee attempts to reach a consen-
sus on a proposed rule. A designated person or persons from the
agency "shall be authorized to fully represent the agency in the
discussions and negotiations of the committee. '70 The agency may
also appoint, with the approval of the committee, an impartial
facilitator or mediator to chair the meetings and assist in the ne-
gotiations.7' If the negotiation process results in a "consensus"
among the committee on language for a proposed rule,72 the
committee is required to submit the rule, with an accompanying
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (1994).
63. Id § 563(a)(2).
64. Id § 563(a)(3).
65. Id § 563(a)(4).
66. See id § 564(a).
67. See id. § 564(a)(2)-(4).
68. See id. § 564(c).
69. Id § 565(b).
70. Id. § 566(b).
71. See id. § 566(c).
72. See supra note 10.
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report, to the agency.73 The agency, in turn, is expected to use
the committee's rule as the basis for its own proposed rule.74 The
end product should be a rule that is more balanced and agreeable
than it might otherwise be.
In addition to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Congress has
adopted at least a dozen statutes that mandate specific agencies to
use negotiated rulemaking to develop certain regulations. 5 Af-
fected agencies include the Departments of Education, Health and
Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Interior,
as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 566(f).
74. See id § 563(a)(7).
75. See, e.g., The Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary
School Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 1431(b), 102 Stat. 130,
189 (requiring the Secretary of Education to "submit regulations on a minimum of 4 key
issues to a modified negotiated rulemaking process as a demonstration of such process");
Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 19, 102 Stat. 1066,
1083-84 (requiring the use of negotiated rulemaking to determine whether radiopharma-
ceutical licensees should be indemnified); Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied Tech-
nology Education Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-392, § 501(c), 104 Stat. 753,
830 (requiring the Secretary of Education to "submit regulations on at least 2 key issues
to a negotiated rulemaking process"); Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-325, § 497, 106 Stat. 448, 633 (stating that "after holding regional meetings and
before publishing proposed regulations . . . the Secretary . . . shall submit such regula-
tions to a negotiated rulemaking process"); Housing and Community Development Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 114(b), 106 Stat. 3672, 3691 (requiring negotiated
rulemaking for "any proposed regulation ... chang[ing] . . . the performance funding
system [for] vacant public housing units"); Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, § 4021, 107 Stat. 341, 353 (requiring use of negotiated rulemaking for all
standards, criteria, procedures, and regulations implementing the federal direct student
loan program); Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §
1601(b), 108 Stat. 3518, 3609-10 (requiring negotiated rulemaking process for regulations
implementing amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965);
Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 105(2),
108 Stat. 4250, 4269-70 (stating that "rulemaking processes under this Act . . . shall [be
guided by] the 'Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990'); Native American Housing Assis-
tance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-330, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 4016,
4029 (requiring the use of negotiated rulemaking for all regulations promulgated under
the Act); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 216, 110 Stat. 1936, 2007 (requiring negotiated rulemaking for regulations
relating to a risk sharing exception to penalties provided under federal health care pro-
grams); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-180, § 734(d), 110 Stat. 1569, 1603
(requiring negotiated rulemaking for housing assistance regulations); Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 1856(a), 111 Stat. 251, 270 (requiring negotiated
rulemaking for financial solvency standards for provider sponsored organizations under
Medicare).
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More recently, negotiated rulemaking has been visibly promot-
ed by the Clinton administration. In March of 1993, President
Clinton asked Vice President Gore to head a six-month review of
the federal executive branch in order to make governmental oper-
ations more efficient. At the end of the first phase of this Nation-
al Performance Review (NPR), the Vice President recommended
that agencies increase their use of "consensus-based rulemaking."
The NPR report issued in early September 1993 attributed a host
of benefits to negotiated rulemaking, including: increased innova-
tion in the substance of regulations; earlier implementation and an
overall reduction of "time, money, and effort;" increased rates of
compliance; "more cooperative relationships" between regulated
parties and federal agencies; and "the potential for avoiding litiga-
tion. 76
Following the recommendation set forth in the NPR report,
the Clinton administration took a variety of steps to increase the
use of negotiated rulemaking across the federal government. In his
September 30, 1993 Executive Order on regulatory review, Clinton
directed each agency "to explore, and where appropriate, use
consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, including nego-
tiated rulemaking., 77 In a memorandum accompanying the execu-
tive order, President Clinton specifically directed eighteen execu-
tive departments and agencies to identify at least one rule to
develop through negotiated rulemaking in 1994, or to explain why
negotiated rulemaking would not be feasible.8 In early March
1995, with the newly-installed Republican Congress clamoring for
comprehensive regulatory reform, President Clinton sent another
memorandum to agency heads directing them "to expand sub-
stantially [their] efforts to promote consensual rulemaking" and to
submit another "list of upcoming rulemakings that can be convert-
ed into negotiated rulemakings.179 Finally, in a subsequently-re-
76. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 30.
77. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994).
78. See President's Negotiated Rulemaking Memorandum, supra note 4, at 52,391.
According to a General Accounting Office report, 17 agencies responded to the order
and 16 identified rules that either "will use, or be considered for, a negotiated
rulemaking." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGEMENT REFORM: IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REviEw's RECOMMENDATIONS 519 (1994).
79. President's Memorandum on Regulatory Reform, Subject: Regulatory Reinvention
Initiative, 1 PUB. PAPERS 304, 305 (Mar. 4, 1995).
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leased strategy paper for "reinventing" federal environmental
regulation, the Clinton administration specifically directed the EPA
to review all its rules to identify potential candidates for negotiat-
ed rulemaking.80
In 1996, the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative
Law of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the
reauthorization of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act.8' In testimony
before the committee, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, Joseph Dear, reiterated concerns that
before the 1990 Act rulemaking had fostered antagonism among
the parties. "Many times," he testified, "the adversarial relation-
ship resulted in time-consuming expensive litigation." 2 Neil
Eisner, an Assistant General Counsel at the Department of Trans-
portation, testified that the process of negotiating a regulation
"should make the rule more acceptable to all of the parties and
should make them less likely to challenge it."' Testifying on be-
half of the American Bar Association, Philip Harter quoted a
Carnegie Commission report to the effect that "the use of negotia-
tion often saves EPA a year or two of 'rulemaking' time." 4 In
floor discussion, Senator Levin stated that "[a]gencies and others
have discovered that, in many rulemaking situations, negotiation
beats confrontation in terms of cost, time, aggravation, and the
ability to develop regulations that parties with very different per-
80. See PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 5 (1995).
81. See Reauthorization of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Reauthorization Hearings]. In 1995, the same committee
heard testimony from C. Boyden Gray on the reauthorization of ACUS in which Gray
noted that "negotiated rulemaking ... is a key building block of regulatory reform be-
cause of the elimination of legal challenges to rulemaking." The Reauthorization of the
Admin. Conference of the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 33 (1995) (statement
of C. Boyden Gray, partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and former General Counsel to
President Bush).
82. 1996 Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 81, at 53 (statement of Joseph A.
Dear, Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration). Dear also
suggested that "the ramifications associated with litigation [are] reduced" by the negotiat-
ed rulemaking process. Id.
83. Id. at 94 (statement of Neil Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation
and Enforcement, United States Department of Transportation).
84. Id. at 69 (statement of Philip Harter on behalf of the American Bar Association)
(quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECH., & GOV'T, RISK AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT' IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING Ill (1993)).
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spectives can accept." 5 Virtually all of the legislative discussion
on the reauthorization of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act affirmed
the success of regulatory negotiation and its continued potential
for, among other things, saving time and reducing legal challenges.
Without much fanfare, legislation permanently reauthorizing the
Act passed through both houses of Congress and was signed by
President Clinton on October 19, 1996.86
As this brief history demonstrates, negotiated rulemaking has
at various times been advertised as something of a cure-all for
most regulatory ills-making rules faster, better, and more effec-
tive, while making affected parties satisfied, empowered, and bet-
ter informed. Proponents have emphasized that the primary pur-
poses of negotiated rulemaking are to reduce rulemaking time and
decrease litigation over regulations.' With Congress and the
President directing more agencies to use negotiated rulemaking
procedures, it is important to assess how effectively negotiated
rulemaking has achieved its two main purposes.
II. THE PERFORMANCE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
In the past, most research on negotiated rulemaking has
drawn on case studies of specific negotiations. Recently, more
systematic research that attempts to evaluate the negotiated
rulemaking process has begun to emerge. Much of this work is
still underway. Brian Polkinghorn, for example, has conducted
extensive interviews with agency staff at the EPA that show how
the use of negotiated rulemakings represents a philosophical shift
in EPA rulemaking towards incorporating the views of outside
groups." Cornelius Kerwin and Laura Langbein have completed
the first phase of an evaluation of regulatory negotiation at EPA
85. 142 CONG. REc. S11,849 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin).
86. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110
Stat. 3870, 3873.
87. In the first appellate court opinion to examine the purposes of the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act, Judge Richard Posner confirmed that "[t]he Act's purpose [is] to reduce
judicial challenges to regulations by encouraging the parties to narrow their differences in
advance of the formal rulemaking proceeding." USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82
F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 1996).
88. See Brian Polkinghorn, The Influence of Regulatory Negotiations on the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency as an Institution (1995) (unpublished paper presented
at the 1995 American Political Science Association meeting, on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
12711997]
1272 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1255
and have reported data drawn from interviews with over a hun-
dred individuals involved in EPA negotiated rulemakings.89 They
found that the participants they interviewed tended overall to view
the process favorably." As Kerwin and Langbein acknowledge,
their conclusions are tentative in that their first phase was limited
to a study of only eight negotiated rulemakings convened by the
EPA without any comparison to conventional rulemaking.9' Pre-
liminary results from the second phase of their study show that
participants in conventional EPA rulemakings similarly view the
conventional process favorably.9"
89. See CORNELIUS KERWIN & LAURA LANGBEIN, AN EVALUATION OF NEGOTI-
ATED RULEMAKING AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: PHASE 1 (1995)
(report prepared for ACUS).
90. See id. at 37 ("Seventy-eight percent responded that the benefits [they realized
from participation] did exceed the costs."). Even among their respondents, however, the
level of support for negotiated rulemaking varies considerably. For example, they find
that representatives from environmental groups reported significantly less satisfaction with
the formal negotiation process. See id. at 40. For examples of environmental group dissat-
isfaction with regulatory negotiation, see Cindy Skrzycki, Emission Impossible: The EPA
Takes on Lawn Tool Makers, WASH. POST, June 21, 1996, at D1 (reporting disap-
pointment over an informal agreement between EPA and industry following a negotiated
rulemaking); Citizens Coal Council Declines OSM's Invitation to Join "Reg-Neg," INSIDE
ENERGY WITH FEDERAL LANDS, June 13, 1994, at 15 (describing citizen group's rejection
of agency's invitation to participate in a negotiated rulemaking).
91. KERWiN & LANGBEIN, supra note 89, at 7, 46, 48. It is not clear from Kerwin
and Langbein's first phase report whether the eight rulemakings were selected at random
or on the basis of other selection criteria. They report that seven of the eight
rulemakings had been "successfully concluded" and one failed to result in a consensus-
proposed rule. Id at 2. Only six of their 101 interview respondents came from the one
"failed" negotiation. Furthermore, due to difficulties in locating respondents, Kerwin and
Langbein dropped from their sample the farmworker protection negotiation, which had
encountered considerable controversy. See id. at 5-6. Although these sampling limitations
may constrain the conclusions one can draw from Kerwin and Langbein's otherwise am-
bitious research, their sample does include seven of the 12 negotiated rules that EPA has
finalized, including four rules over which petitions for review were filed. See id. at 2-3. It
is not clear from the first phase report how respondents were selected nor how many
respondents came from EPA, industry, and environmental groups, categories which have
significantly different overall ratings of negotiated rulemaking. See id. at 40.
92. Kerwin and Langbein are continuing a second phase of their project that involves
approximately 50 interviews with participants from six conventional EPA rulemakings. A
preliminary draft of this second phase report was made available at the time this Article
was in press. Although a full review of the second phase results cannot be made at this
time, it bears noting that Kerwin and Langbein found no significant difference in the net
value participants attributed, to their participation in negotiated rulemaking as opposed to
conventional rulemaking. See Cornelius Kerwin & Laura Langbein, An Evaluation of
Negotiated Rulemaking at the Environmental Protection Agency: Phase II: A Comparison
of Conventional and Negotiated Rulemaking 26 (Aug. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) ("[T]here was both no statistically significant difference between the two
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As these studies suggest, much of the current empirical analy-
sis of negotiated rulemaking focuses on the EPA. Because the
EPA has attempted and completed the most negotiated
rulemakings,93 and has figured prominently in past claims about
both the need for, and success of, negotiated rulemaking, 94 re-
searchers must continue to focus on the EPA in order to assess
the performance of negotiated rulemaking. That said, a more
comprehensive understanding of the impact of negotiated
rulemaking can be gleaned from an initial examination of the
extent to which other agencies have used consensus-based proce-
dures.
Using searches of Federal Register notices supplemented with
listings published by ACUS, I was able to identify a comprehen-
sive dataset of negotiated rulemakings across all federal agen-
cies.95 The data reveal the overall infrequent use of negotiated
rulemaking at the federal level. By the end of 1996, seventeen
federal agencies had initiated at least one negotiated rulemaking
process (Table 1). Each of these agencies had initiated an average
of 4 (or median of 2) negotiated proceedings. Of the seventeen
agencies, only twelve had actually issued a final rule based on a
regulatory negotiation. As a point of comparison, almost sixty
regulatory agencies are listed in a recent unified agenda of federal
regulations,96 and over fifty agencies regularly have their rules re-
viewed by the Office of Management and Budget.97
groups and overwhelming majorities (85% for reg negs and 76% for conventional
rulemaking) who stated that the benefits they realized from participation equalled or
exceeded the costs.").
93. See infra Table 1.
94. See, eg., IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 31 (using EPA to
illustrate purported time savings and reduction in litigation from negotiated rulemaking);
Susskind & MacMahon, supra note 17, at 133 (relying on EPA case studies to suggest
the "great promise" of negotiated rulemaking). ACUS has reported that "[o]nly one
agency, EPA, has institutionalized negotiated rulemaking with a small full-time staff to
evaluate candidates for either reg-neg or other consensus-building processes and to man-
age the process ultimately selected." ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 16.
95. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act requires agencies to publish a notice in the
Federal Register "that the agency intends to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee
to negotiate and develop a proposed rule." 5 U.S.C. § 564(a)(1) (1994).
96. See Introduction to The Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,005, 62,005-06 (1996).
97. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1991-MAR 31, 1992 [hereinafter OMB, 1992
REGULATORY PROGRAM].
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Table 1. Agency Use of Negotiated Rulemaking, 1983-1996
Agency Abandoned Pending Final
Arch'l & Transp. Barriers Compl. Bd. 0 1 0
Dep't of Agriculture 1 1 1
Dep't of Education 1 0 6
Dep't of Energy 1 0 0
Dep't of Health & Human Services. 0 1 1
Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. 0 1 1
Dep't of Interior 3 4 1
Dep't of Labor 0 2 2
Dep't of Transportation 0 4 7
Envtl. Protection Agency 3 3 12
Equal Opportunity Empl. Comm'n 0 1 0
Farm Credit Admin. 0 0 1
Fed. Communications Comm'n 1 1 2
Fed. Trade Comm'n 1 0 0
Interstate Commerce Comm'n 1 0 0
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n 1 0 1
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 0 0 1
Sources: On-line searches of Federal Register volumes from 1980 through 1996 were made
and supplemented with a review of reports published by the Administrative Conference of the
United States. The category of "abandoned" rules represents those rulemakings for which, at
some point following publication of the intent to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee, the
agency failed to commence negotiations, the agency disbanded an established committee prior
to attempting to reach even a limited resolution, or the agency withdrew the underlying
rulemaking altogether. The category "pending" represents those rulemakings for which a
negotiated rulemaking committee was utilized but for which a final rule had yet to be
promulgated by the end of 1996. The category of "final" represents those negotiated
rulemakings that have resulted in at least one final rule, notwithstanding subsequent efforts to
make further revisions or promulgate additional rules. Appendices A, B, and C contain citations
to the rulemakings in each of these three categories.
Of the sixty-seven negotiated rulemakings that had been an-
nounced by the end of 1996, in 13 proceedings (or nearly 20 per-
cent) the agency abandoned the formal negotiated process before
any consensus could develop." Nineteen of the rulemakings re-
98. By "abandoned," I do not mean that the participants failed to reach a consensus.
Rather, I refer to those rules for which, at some point after the agency published an in-
tent to negotiate, the agency decided not to commence negotiations, disbanded the com-
mittee before seeking even a limited agreement, or withdrew the underlying regulatory
action altogether. Appendix A contains citations to the notices of intent to negotiate for
this category of "abandoned" negotiations. In one instance, the Department of Interior
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mained pending, with a final rule yet to be issued.99 Since 1983,
when the FAA initiated the first negotiated rulemaking, federal
agencies have promulgated only thirty-five rules using the alterna-
tive procedure, or about 2.7 each year.'0°
Compared with the number of federal agencies and the vol-
ume of rules promulgated each year, this level of rulemaking is
low. Figure 1 shows the annual number of negotiated rules initiat-
ed and promulgated from 1983 to 1996. The use of negotiated
rulemaking has increased somewhat in recent years, following the
(DOI) did not publish a separate notice of intent for one of its negotiated rulemakings.
The citation listed in Appendix A for the DOI offshore air quality rulemaking refers to
the earliest Federal Register notice that acknowledged DOI's decision to use formal nego-
tiation for this rulemaking.
99. Appendix B contains citations to the notices of intent to negotiate these nineteen
rules. Extensive searches of the Federal Register were made to confirm the status of
these pending rulemakings as of the end of 1996.
100. Appendix C contains citations to the final negotiated rules promulgated by the
end of 1996. In compiling this list of final rules, I made three choices that should be
noted. First, one negotiated rulemaking, on Indian self-determination, was jointly con-
vened by both the Department of Interior and the Department of Health and Human
Services. I have treated it as one rulemaking, even though it is counted twice in the
breakdown by agency in Table 1. See Indian Self-Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 32,482
(1996). Second, I have included in this listing only one of the Department of Education's
final rules which emerged from its modified negotiated rulemaking process under the
Higher Education Amendments of 1992. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, 59
Fed. Reg. 22,348 (1994). The process was modified in the sense that the Department pre-
sented the negotiated rulemaking committee with draft proposed rules at the outset of
the committee process. The committee participants divided into several meetings and the
agency promulgated three additional final rules. See Institutional Eligibility Under the
Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended; Eligibility of Foreign Medical Schools Under
the Guaranteed Student Loan Program (GLSP), 59 Fed. Reg. 22,062 (1994) (codified at
34 C.F.R. pts. 600 & 601); Secretary's Procedures and Criteria for Recognition of Ac-
crediting Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (1994) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 602); Institu-
tional Eligibility Under the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, 59 Fed. Reg.
22,324 (1994) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 600). By including only one higher education
rule, I have followed the categorization of ACUS which lists the process as a single
negotiated rulemaking proceeding. See ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at
45-46. The findings reported in this Article would not change in any substantial way if
the three additional higher education rules were included in the analysis. Finally, I have
treated the EPA's disinfectant byproducts negotiated rulemaking as having been complet-
ed, even though in actuality only one of the three proposed rules to emerge from that
set of negotiations has been made final. See Drinking Water Information Collection Rule,
61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141). Two additional proposed
rules, which would set substantive drinking water standards, remain pending from the
disinfectant byproducts negotiation. See Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 59 Fed.
Reg. 38,668 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 & 142) (proposed July 29, 1994);
Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Requirements, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,832 (1994) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 & 142) (proposed July 29, 1994).
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Figure 1. Negotiated Rulemakings, 1983-1996
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Negotiated Rulemaking Act and the various presidential and statu-
tory directives. Nevertheless, the overall proportion of agency
regulations adopted using negotiated rulemaking remains consis-
tently small-less that one-tenth of one percent, as shown in Table
2. In comparison with overall regulatory activity, then, the rate of
negotiated rulemakings has been minuscule. 1' In these terms,
negotiated rulemaking certainly is very much still "a novelty in the
administrative process," as Judge Richard Posner opined in a
recent Seventh Circuit decision."
Whatever the purported benefits of negotiated rulemaking,
agency staff appear not to perceive these benefits as a singularly
motivating factor. Indeed, Polkinghom reports that "the negotiati-
101. A similarly low rate probably exists at the state level as well, notwithstanding
recent statutes in several states authorizing the use of negotiated rulemaking. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(2)(d)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (allowing for negotiated
rulemaking and outlining procedural requirements); IDAHO CODE § 67-5220 (1995) (en-
couraging informal negotiations prior to the promulgation of an agency rule); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 2-5-101-110 (1995) (establishing framework for negotiated rulemaking);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-921-932 (Michie 1993) (establishing framework for negotiat-
ed rulemaking).
102. USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Mark E. Rushefsky, Reducing Risk Conflict by Regulatory Negotiation: A Preliminary
Evaluation, in SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 109, 120 (Stuart S. Nagel
& Miriam K. Mills eds., 1991) ("[N]egotiated rule-making is in its infancy, an experi-
ment .... "). But see Philip J. Harter, First Judicial Review of Reg Neg a Disappoint-
ment, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 1996, at 1, 12 (arguing that Judge Posner's "phrase
seems more designed to trivialize the process than any sort of historical description").
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Table 2. Negotiated Rulemaking as Percentage of Final Rules
Final
Year Final Rules Negotiated Rules Percent
1983 3931 0 0.00%
1984 3515 0 0.00%
1985 3351 2 0.06%
1986 3287 1 0.03%
1987 3295 2 0.06%
1988 3442 3 0.09%
1989 3416 2 0.06%
1990 3174 1 0.03%
1991 3184 2 0.06%
1992 3022 4 0.13%
1993 3184 3 0.09%
1994 3567 5 0.14%
1995 3473 3 0.09%
1996 3762 7 0.19%
Total 47603 35 0.07%
Sources: The numbers for final rules were obtained using computer searches conducted
by year in the LEXIS Fedreg database. I used a restrictive search that retrieved all
documents containing the words "final rule" or "final rulemaking" in the action
category, but excluded those documents with the words "correction," "technical
amendment," or "clarification" in the same category. The numbers for final negotiated
rules were obtained using searches in the Federal Register supplemented with a review
of reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
on process has not been as popular with EPA employees as it was
originally anticipated for resolving crucial rulemaking probl-
ems."' 3 There are certainly any number of possible explanations
for the infrequent reliance on negotiated rulemaking, including the
inappropriateness of a formal negotiation process for many rules
or the difficulties associated with chartering an advisory commit-
tee."° It may well also be that skepticism on the part of agency
103. Polkinghom, supra note 88, at 13. But cf. KERWIN & LANGBEIN, supra note 89,
at 40 (noting that among the participants interviewed, EPA officials gave the highest
overall rating to negotiated rulemaking).
104. The procedural requirements associated with creating an advisory committee may
serve to discourage the use of negotiated rulemaking. The statute reauthorizing the Nego-
tiated Rulemaking Act directs the Office of Management and Budget to streamline Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requirements and make recommendations for
further amendments to FACA that will encourage more negotiated rulemaking. See Ad-
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staff partly explains why the use of negotiated rulemaking has
made only a tiny dent in the overall regulatory activity of the
federal government. Although a complete explanation for the
infrequent use of negotiated rulemaking is beyond the scope of
this Article, I do seek to consider whether the apparent reluctance
of agency staff to use negotiated rulemaking is itself justified. In
other words, should agency managers concerned with reducing
regulatory delays and avoiding litigation use negotiated rulemaking
more frequently?
A. The Length of Negotiated Rulemaking Proceedings
One advantage formal negotiated rulemaking purportedly has
over informal rulemaking is its ability to produce rules in less
time. Yet the impact negotiation has on the time it takes to devel-
op a regulation remains unclear. In a 1987 article, former EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas stated that "as we look back upon our
experiences with negotiated rules so far, they have saved time.
Regulatory negotiation shortened our total process on each one of
them."1 5 The National Performance Review report on the regu-
latory process similarly stated that negotiated rulemaking at EPA
has saved up to eighteen months compared with conventional
rulemaking.'t Despite this proclaimed efficiency, the NPR au-
thors also interestingly cautioned Congress not to impose "short
ministrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11, 110 Stat. 3870,
3873-74. See generally Stephen P. Croley, Practical Guidance on the Applicability of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 111, 119-23 (1996) (discussing
the uncertainties and burdens associated with FACA).
105. Thomas, supra note 29, at 3. The final ACUS report on negotiated rulemaking
quotes Sheldon M. Guttman, Associate General Counsel and Dispute Resolution Special-
ist at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), as concluding that "[t]he Commis-
sion continues to view negotiated rulemaking as a time saving and cost effective method
of developing standards .... We have found that negotiated rulemaking forces parties to
focus quickly on the key issues and ultimately saves us time and money in rulemaking
matters." ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 27. It is difficult to say on
what basis the FCC made such a "finding" of the "ultimate" time savings of negotiated
rulemaking. At that time, the FCC had only finalized one rule through a formal negotiat-
ed rulemaking process. See Provision of Non-Voice Low Earth Orbit Satellite Services, 58
Fed. Reg. 68,053 (1993) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 2 & 25) (FCC). The experience of
the FCC in finalizing negotiated rules was so limited at that time that the same ACUS
report that quoted Guttman did not list any FCC negotiated rule as having been com-
pleted. ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 63-64 (listing no final rule for
the FCC in its table of federal negotiated rulemakings).
106. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 32-33 n.8.
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statutory deadlines to issue proposed or final rules, especially if
they are shorter than two years [because this may] preclude the
use of negotiated rulemaking."'" In at least one instance, a fed-
eral agency decided that "negotiated rulemaking was not a practi-
cal option" for the development of regulations because of statuto-
ry time constraints.' 8 Although negotiated rulemakings may not
be sufficiently fast when an agency must meet stringent deadlines,
overall they have been thought to be potential time-savers.0 9
To measure the impact of negotiated rulemaking on regulato-
ry development time, I analyzed the federal negotiated
rulemakings that have been completed to date. The average nego-
tiated rulemaking takes a little less than two and a half years to
complete, from the time the agency announces its intent to form a
negotiated rulemaking committee to the time the final rule is
published (see Table 3). Among all 35 regulatory negotiations that
have yielded final rules, the shortest took only about half a year
to complete-Coast Guard regulations for drawbridges over the
Chicago River (179 days)."0 At the other extreme, the EPA's
farmworker pesticide protection standards, which failed to achieve
full consensus after one of the parties left the negotiation, took
2,528 days, or nearly seven years, to complete."' The average
107. Id. at 32.
108. Food Labeling Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,394, 60,397 (1991) (FDA). Ordinarily,
of course, it has been thought that deadlines will help move negotiations along. See infra
note 287 and accompanying text. It is not known how many agencies rule out the use of
negotiated rulemaking due to concerns about deadlines. If it could be shown that many
agencies do not use negotiated rulemaking because of deadline concerns, this finding
would tend to undermine claims about time savings from negotiated rulemaking.
109. See supra notes 12, 31, 60 and accompanying text.
110. See Drawbridge Operation Regulations, Chicago River, IL, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,061,
18,061 (1995) (notice of intent to negotiate made on April 10, 1995) (U.S. Coast Guard);
Drawbridge Operation Regulations, Chicago River, IL, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,298, 52,298 (1995)
(final rule promulgated on October 6, 1995) (U.S. Coast Guard).
111. See Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Proposed Farmworker
Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (1985) (notice of
intent to negotiate published on Sept. 19, 1985); Worker Protection Standard, 57 Fed.
Reg. 38,102 (1992) (final rule published on Aug. 21, 1992). To say that the worker pro-
tection rule is "completed" is somewhat of a misnomer. The rule is still subject to con-
tentious debate. EPA has issued extensions and changes to the rule, Congress has en-
tered the fray, and outside groups have threatened litigation. See, e.g., Act of April 6,
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-231, 108 Stat. 333 (extending compliance dates for worker protec-
tion standards); Worker Training Grace Period Suit Against EPA Likely, 23 PESTICIDES &
ToxIc CHEMICAL NEWS, Apr. 19, 1995, at 10 (discussing intention of several parties to
sue the EPA depending on the length of the worker training grace period found in the
worker protection standard); Brian Broderick, Pesticides: EPA Issues Changes to Farm
1280 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:1255
number of days for completion so far has been 835 (with a stan-
dard deviation of 577); the median has been 651, or over one and
three quarters years. Of course, a couple of years may seem short
compared with the decades that certain notorious rulemakings
sometimes seem to last, or it may seem somewhat long compared
with the speed that some might expect of the government in ad-
dressing serious public concerns. What is needed is a standard for
comparison, a group of comparable rules developed using conven-
tional notice-and-comment procedures.'12
Any number of variables may offset the length of the
rulemaking process, including the agency promulgating the rule,
the complexity of the rule to be issued, and the priority the rule
holds for the agency. Establishing the comparability of two regula-
tions is no easy matter, but Kerwin and Furlong made an initial
attempt in their valuable study of the length of rulemaking at
EPA."3 They compared the time of four negotiated EPA
rulemakings with the average time for all EPA rulemakings that
entered into the agency's internal regulatory development manage-
ment system during fiscal years 1987-1990. The latter group amou-
Worker Re-Entry, Training, Exemption Provisions, 19 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 101 (Apr.
28, 1995) (detailing five changes to the worker protection standard); Farmworker Group
Plans to Sue Over EPA's Final WPS Changes, 23 PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS,
May 23, 1995, at 7 (analyzing the changes to the worker protection standard and the
planned suit by the Farm Worker Justice Fund against the EPA); Farmers and Workers
Alike Find Fault with Worker Protection Standards, 24 PESTICIDES & TOXIC CHEMICAL
NEWS, July 17, 1996, at 10 (noting the concerns of farmers and workers with the changes
to the worker protection standard). My findings, of course, do not show that negotiated
rulemaking has caused this contentiousness or made the worker protection standards the
longest negotiated rulemaking undertaken by any agency. Rather, they show that even
with negotiated rulemaking procedures this rule could not be completed within a short
amount of time, because negotiation cannot resolve all underlying value conflicts and dis-
putes over scientific evidence. Negotiated rulemaking may have given the agency some
information (for it is hard to imagine conversations with agency staff members that would
not provide some information), but that information did not make this a short
rulemaking.
112. Some readers may begin to wonder whether I have chosen the appropriate set of
rules for comparison in the analyses to follow. As I explain in the text, the types of
rules I compare in this Article are identical to those others have used in the past to
support claims about the impact of negotiated rulemaking, in the few instances where
such claims have been supported with data. In Part nI.A of this Article, I examine the
issue of "treatment" and "control" groups more closely, paying attention to the possibility
of bias in the rules selected for formal negotiation. That analysis confirms the appropri-
ateness of the comparison groups I use. See infra Part III.A.
113. See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking An Empiri-
cal Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113 (1992).
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Table 3. Time for Completed Negotiated Rulemakings, 1985-1996
Reg-Neg Final Rule
Agency Negotiated Rulemaking Announced Published Days
DOT Flight Time Requirements 5/12/83 7/18/85 798
DOL Occup'l Exp. to Benzene 7/8/83 9/11/87 1526
EPA Nonconformance Penalties 4/24/84 8/30/85 493
EPA Emergency Pesticide Exemptions 8/3/84 1/15/86 530
EPA Farmworker Protection Standards 9/19/85 8/21/92 2528
DOL 4,4'-Methylenedianiline 10/22/85 8/10/92 2484
EPA Residential Woodstoves 2/7/86 2/26/88 749
EPA Underground Injection 7/14/86 7/26/88 743
EPA RCRA Permit Modifications 7/16/86 9/28/88 805
DOT Nondiscrimination in Air Travel 8/22/86 3/6/90 1292
NRC Waste-Site Licensing Records 12/18/86 4/14/89 848
EPA Asbestos in Schools 1/13/87 10/30/87 290
DOE Financial Assist. for Special Educ. 7/12/88 5/19/89 311
EPA VOC Equipment Leaks 4/25/89 4/22/94 1823
DOT Handicapped Parking 6/12/89 3/11/91 637
DOA Control of Scrapie 7/13/89 12/9/92 1245
DOE Vocational & Technology Educ. 10/12/90 8/14/92 672
DOT Transp. for Disabled 1/11/91 9/6/91 238
EPA Clean Fuels 2/8/91 2/16/94 1104
DOT Oil Spill Vessel Response Plans 11/18/91 1/12/96 1516
EPA Coke Oven Batteries 1/15/92 10/27/93 651
FCC Non-Voice Satellite Servs. 5/1/92 12/23/93 601
FCA Administrative Expenses 5/6/92 2/23/93 293
DOE Higher Educ. Amendments 8/26/92 4/29/94 611
EPA Drinking Water Info. Collection 9/15/92 5/14/96 1337
EPA Wood Furniture Coatings 11/25/92 12/7/95 1107
DOE Direct Student Loans 12/28/93 12/1/94 338
DOE Guaranty Agency Reserves 1/19/94 11/25/94 310
DOT Roadway Worker Protection 8/17/94 12/16/96 852
DOE Disadvantaged Students 10/28/94 7/3/95 248
FCC Hearing Aid Compatible Telephones 11/23/94 8/14/96 630
HHS/DOI Indian Self-Determination 12/29/94 6/24/96 543
HUD Subsidies for Public Housing 1/3/95 2/28/96 421
DOT Chicago Drawbridge Operations 4/10/95 10/6/95 179
PBGC Reportable Events 8/11/95 12/2/96 479
Abbreviations: DOA - Dept. of Agriculture; DOE - Dept. of Education; DOI - Dept of Interior;
DOL - Dept of Labor; DOT - Dept of Transp.; EPA - Envtl. Protection Agency; FCA - Farm
Credit Admin.; FCC - Fed. Communications Comm'n; HHS - Dept of Health & Human Servs.;
HUD -Dept of Housing & Urban Develop.; NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n; PBGC - Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp.
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nted roughly to the most substantial 15 percent of all EPA rules
adopted during this period."4
In calculating the length of a rulemaking, Kerwin and Furlong
relied on internal EPA files to determine the date when each rule
entered into the agency's regulatory development management
system and the date when it was finalized. They found that the
rules in their study took an average of 3.0 years (1108 days) from
start to finish. In contrast, the four negotiated rules initiated dur-
ing the time period of their study took an average of only 2.1
years (778 days) to complete, a time savings of eleven months."5
Although Kerwin and Furlong acknowledged that the number of
negotiated rules in their study was small, they interpreted their
data to demonstrate that negotiated rulemaking is "more expe-
ditious" than conventional rulemaking."16 Their analysis underlies
the National Performance Review report's claim that regulatory
negotiation is faster than conventional rulemaking." 7
Of course, if all twelve of EPA's negotiated rules are exam-
ined, rather than just four, the suggested time savings of negotiat-
ed rulemaking could well be different."' To determine the
114. As Kerwin and Furlong noted, they limited their analysis "to those rules devel-
oped under the normal rulemaking process in the agency. This left out of the study
those classes of rules deemed sufficiently routine or inconsequential to be exempted from
OMB review, as well as from most EPA internal management requirements." Id. at 122.
Their sample included 150 rules that EPA initiated between October 1, 1986, and Sep-
tember 30, 1989. See id. My research shows that during this same period, EPA issued
approximately 1000 final rules, excluding corrections and technical amendments.
115. See id. at 124, 134. The median time found by Kerwin and Furlong, however,
does not show any notable time savings. The median time for negotiated rules (868 days)
was virtually the same as the median time for all rules (872 days). See id. at 134.
116. Id. at 124.
117. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 32-33 n.8 (citing
Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 113, at 124). The National Performance Review report
also refers to an interview with Chris Kirtz, the director of EPA's Office of Consensus
and Dispute Resolution, indicating that EPA saved from 6 to 18 months with seven of
its negotiated rulemaking proceedings. See id.
118. The twelve negotiated rules are those for which the EPA has promulgated a
final rule. See infra Appendix C. All 12 of these rules are included in EPA's internal list
of negotiated rulemakings, as are three negotiated rulemakings for which the agency has
yet to issue a final rule. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Negotiated Rulemaking at
the Environmental Protection Agency (1994) [hereinafter Negotiated Rulemaking at
EPA]; see also ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 55-63 (listing negotiated
rulemaking proceedings at EPA). The only other rulemaking included on EPA's internal
list is the lead acid battery recycling rule, see id. at 59, which I treat as "abandoned"
because the EPA withdrew the entire rulemaking and adjourned the negotiation commit-
tee after several meetings. See supra note 98.
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length of all EPA negotiated rulemakings, I calculated the differ-
ence in time between the date the agency announced its intent to
create a negotiated rulemaking committee and the date the agency
published its final rule in the Federal Register. Although this meth-
od differs from that used by Kerwin and Furlong in that it relies
on published government records instead of internal agency files,
my reliance on published materials turns out to favor time savings
for negotiated rules. For example, Federal Register listings yield an
average time for the four negotiated rules in the Kerwin and
Furlong study of 1.8 years (647 days), more than four months
shorter than the average they report for the same rules." 9 The
difference is likely explained by the considerable amount of prepa-
ratory work that goes into deciding whether and how to conduct a
negotiated rulemaking, work which precedes the publication of a
notice to establish a negotiation committee.
The average time period for all 12 of the negotiated rules
promulgated by the EPA is 2.8 years (1013 days). The four nego-
tiated rules in the Kerwin and Furlong study therefore turn out to
be rather atypical, taking roughly half as long on average as the
other rules.Y In contrast to the eleven-month time savings sug-
119. In seeking to dismiss my findings as "meaningless" and "fundamentally flawed,"
Philip Harter has mischaracterized my method of analysis. See Philip J. Harter, Fear of
Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DuKE L.J. 1389, 1421-22 & n.117 (1997).
He invokes examples of rulemakings for which the Coast Guard and FAA published
notices of proposed rulemakings before they initiated negotiated rulemaking processes.
According to Harter, these examples show that using Federal Register notices as a basis
for measurement "makes the process appear very long." Id. The implication is that I
based my analysis on the earliest Federal Register notice I could find for a rulemaking.
As I make clear in the text, however, I did not use early notices or advance notices of
proposed rulemaking as a starting point for calculating rulemaking time. I used agency
notices of intent to use negotiated rulemaking. The "clock" had not started "ticking" when
the Coast Guard and FAA published their initial notices of proposed rulemaking. It only
started ticking when the agencies announced their plans to use negotiated rulemaking.
120. It should be noted that one of these twelve rules, the disinfectant byproducts
rule, is incomplete. The EPA has promulgated one final rule resulting from the negotia-
tion, but it is a rule designed to collect additional data for the EPA to use in promulgat-
ing its substantive drinking water standards. See Drinking Water Information Collection
Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141). The substantive stan-
dards have been proposed but as of this writing were still pending while the agency
gathered information under the ICR. See Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Require-
ments, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,832 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 & 142) (pro-
posed July 29, 1994); Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,668
(1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 & 142) (proposed July 29, 1994). By using
the date of the first final rule to emerge from this negotiated rulemaking process, even
though it is an information collection rule and not a drinking water standard, I introduce
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gested by Kerwin and Furlong, my analysis of all of EPA's negoti-
ated rules suggests (at most) little more than three months savings
compared with the rules issued in the period studied by Kerwin
and Furlong, a difference which could well be accounted for by
choices of measurement. 21 When the EPA's three pending negoti-
ated rules are added, the time savings between the two procedures
disappears altogether." If we were to assume, for sake of estima-
tion, that the EPA had promulgated all three pending rules at the
end of December 1996, the average time for promulgating nego-
tiated rules at EPA would increase to 3.1 years (1129 days), three
weeks longer than the average reported by Kerwin and Furlong
for all EPA rules."z
The whole of the available evidence on the time span of
EPA's negotiated rules markedly contrasts with the claims of con-
siderable time savings attributed to negotiated rulemaking. Of
course, any comparison of negotiated and conventional rules may
have its limits because the time it takes to develop rules is surely
affected by factors other than just the use or nonuse of formal
negotiated procedures. 24 Even though the EPA has conducted the
another deliberate bias in favor of finding a time savings in rules developed with negoti-
ated rulemaking procedures. Cf. GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCI-
ENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 155-57 (1994) (cautioning against sys-
tematic measurement error).
121. As noted earlier, my method of calculating rulemaking time underestimates the
internal rulemaking time by as much as four months when compared with the method
used by Kerwin and Furlong. See supra text accompanying note 119.
122. These three pending negotiated rulemakings are the Hazardous Waste Manifests
Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,765 (1992) (EPA); the Architectural and Industrial Maintenance
(AIM) Coatings Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 1443 (1992) (EPA), and the Small Nonroad Engine
Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,061 (1993) (EPA). Each of these proceedings was still pending at
the beginning of 1997.
123. See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 113, at 134. Using the median length of
rulemaking, the time differences are more mixed. The median time for the 12 completed
EPA negotiated rules (777 days) is several months shorter than the median for all EPA
rules (872 days). See supra note 115 and accompanying text. However, the median time
for all 15 EPA negotiated rules is 1104 days, notably longer than the median for all
EPA rules.
124. One factor delaying promulgation in some cases might be the intervention of
governing legislation. In response to an earlier version of this Article, Philip Harter cor-
rectly noted that the volatile organic chemical equipment leaks rulemaking was delayed
due to factors outside the negotiation process itself. See Harter, supra note 119, app. B,
at 1425. The equipment leaks negotiations were conducted in the months prior to
the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990). Following passage of the amendments, the EPA folded the equipment leaks rule
into the larger Hazardous Organic Chemical Emission Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (1994)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (EPA). While the time EPA needed to promulgate this
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most negotiated rulemakings of any agency, it still has only pro-
mulgated 12 rules (and has only three others pending). Yet as I
discuss in Part III.A, it does not appear that these negotiated rules
were prone at the outset to demand more of the EPA's time."2
Moreover, the experience at EPA seems consistent with the im-
pression of at least one other agency that has completed a number
of rules through the negotiated rulemaking process. The Depart-
ment of Education "has reported that it realized no significant
time savings through the use of the process."
'16
In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the mere
passage of chronological time-from notice of intent to final
rule-probably itself understates the amount of time devoted to
negotiated rulemaking. After all, rules that the EPA issues in a
shorter amount of "chronological time" may well reflect the ex-
penditure of substantially more "aggregate time" by agency staff
and interest group representatives. Rules that appear to take more
chronological time may do so simply because they sit dormant
while agency staff members tend to other matters.
Even though negotiated rulemaking at the EPA takes at least
the same amount of chronological time as all rules studied by
Kerwin and Furlong, by most accounts negotiated rulemaking
demands much more concentrated amounts of time on the part of
agency and non-agency participants." To borrow a phrase from
particular negotiated rule may have been delayed by the passage of a statutory amend-
ment, such delays surely afflict rules issued using conventional rulemaking procedures as
well. Ideally, to account for any time-order changes in the length of rulemaking, it would
be helpful to replicate the analysis conducted by Kerwin and Furlong and extend it to
the present time. Despite the potential limitations inherent in a small, nonexperimental
evaluation (as this one by necessity is) the comparisons made here do permit reasonable
inferences about the impact of negotiated rulemaking. See infra notes 253-93 and accom-
panying text.
125. See infra notes 272-74, 281-93 and accompanying text.
126. ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 29 n.38 (citing Memorandum
from Ted Sky, Senior Counsel, Department of Education, to Judith Winston, General
Counsel, Department of Education (Nov. 3, 1994)).
127. See, eg., KERWIN, supra note 18, at 190 (stating that negotiated rulemaking de-
mands an "extraordinary commitment of time" and "negotiation sessions themselves are
demanding activities that can wreak havoc with normal work responsibilities"); Peter
Schneider & Ellen Tohn, Success in Negotiating Environmental Regulations, 9 ENVrL.
IMPACr ASSESSMENT REV. 67, 77 (1985) ("Regulatory negotiation is surprisingly resource
intensive."); Siegler, supra note 17, at 10,651 ("A major disadvantage of the reg-neg pro-
cess is that it can be extremely resource-intensive and stressful."); ACUS, BUILDING
CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 28 (reporting that Department of Agriculture has found
negotiated rulemaking to be "expensive").
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Brian Polkinghorn, negotiated rulemaking is a "time compres-
sor.' " The negotiated rulemaking process contains all the ele-
ments of the conventional procedure, but "in reg-neg all of them
are compressed into one preemptive, intense, time consuming
negotiated interaction.' ' 129  As an early EPA report on the
agency's experience with negotiated rulemaking described, "EPA
managers who have been the Agency's negotiators have devoted
far more time to the negotiations in which they were involved
than they ordinarily would spend on a single rulemaking ef-
fort."'"3 Once the negotiations are completed, moreover, EPA
staff still must spend the additional time associated with drafting
regulatory language and responding to comments. Even those who
are otherwise positively inclined toward regulatory negotiation ac-
knowledge that the process demands a considerable amount of
time and resources up-front.' When negotiated rulemaking
compresses staff time in this way and still ends up taking at least
as long as conventional rulemaking, it is impossible to conclude
that it has successfully increased the speed of the regulatory pro-
cess.
B. Negotiated Rulemaking and Litigation
If formal regulatory negotiations do not save agencies (or at
least the EPA) much in the way of time, at least they are thought
to stave off litigation. By bringing interested parties together to
reach a consensus, the agency expects to avoid subsequent peti-
tions for review. In this way, negotiated rulemaking could in theo-
128. Polkinghom, supra note 88, at 28.
129. Id. at 4.
130. PROGRAM EVALUATION Div., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ASSESS-
MENT OF EPA'S NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AcrivrEs 8 (1987), reprinted in 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 23, 30.
131. See, e.g., IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 32 ("[T]he con-
centrated investment of effort and expense in the short term may be a serious obsta-
cle."); Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in
Public Policymaking, 11 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 200 (1992) (noting that "ser-
vice in regulatory negotiations has proven to be quite time-consuming compared to the
adversary process, which creates a problem for organizations with limited resources");
Daniel Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Form of Public Participation, in FAIRNESS
AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DISCOURSE 223, 232 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995) ("Although negotiation may not
take more time overall than a conventional rulemaking, the time demands are more
concentrated.").
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ry save the agency the time and resources it takes to litigate or
settle a legal challenge.'
As I showed in Part I, the goal of reducing litigation was a
driving force behind the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. 3  Accord-
ing to some, negotiated rulemaking has achieved this goal. Former
EPA Administrator Lee Thomas asserted that at his agency
"[r]egulatory negotiation has reduced litigation.""' The National
Performance Review reported a reduction in the 80 percent rate
at which EPA rules are challenged to a rate of 20 percent follow-
ing the introduction of negotiated rulemaking.'35 The former re-
search director of ACUS has written that agencies developing
rules through negotiation have succeeded in "dramatically reducing
the rate of litigation over those rules."'36
As NPR's own report makes clear, rules promulgated follow-
ing a regulatory negotiation are far from immune from legal chal-
lenge.'37 The EPA's visibility rule for the Grand Canyon area is
132. See, e.g., Pritzker, supra note 29, at 51 (noting "[Il]ong-term savings from reduced
litigation").
133. See supra notes 26-61 and accompanying text.
134. Thomas, supra note 29, at 1, 3.
135. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 32 n.7.
136. Lubbers, supra note 29, at 1172. Other government officials agree that negotiated
rulemaking has reduced litigation. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of
1995: Hearings on S. 343 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 11-14 (1995) (statement of ACUS Chair-
person Thomasina V. Rogers) (stating that negotiated rulemaking "has produced rules
that have engendered much less litigation than conventional rulemaking processes"); Im-
plementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 103d Cong. 53 (1993) (statement of EPA Administrator
Carol M. Browner) (noting that regulatory negotiations "reduce chances of legal chal-
lenge"); Notice of Final Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and Opportunity for Com-
ment, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,424, 40,425 (1996) (Department of Interior) (stating that negotiated
rulemaking can "reduce the high rate of litigation"); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FiCE, CLEAN Am RULEMAKING 5 (1995) (relating report of EPA officials that negotiated
rulemaking can save time by "minimizing the likelihood of litigation after promulgation").
Academic researchers have reached similar conclusions. In its recent report on risk deci-
sionmaking, the National Research Council noted that "litigation is reported to be less
likely" following a negotiated rulemaking process. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 13, at 202. Professor Cornelius Kerwin has written (somewhat tautologically) that
"[w]hen the process works well all current indications are that litigation rates are quite
low." KERWIN, supra note 18, at 191.
137. As a matter of law, the mere fact that an agency secured the "consensus" of a
negotiated rulemaking committee on a rule does not make that rule immune from judi-
cial challenge. See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994) ("Nothing in this section shall bar judicial re-
view of a rule if such judicial review is otherwise provided by law."). A recurring issue
in legal literature is whether negotiated rules should nevertheless be afforded greater
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a notable example. Although not conducted under the auspices of
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, this visibility rule has been cited
as a prominent illustration of the regulatory negotiation process'
potential."8 Beginning in the early 1980s, the EPA, in an at-
tempt to improve visibility in the Grand Canyon National Park,
confronted the question of emissions controls for the Navaho
Generating Station (NGS), a coal-fired power plant located in
northern Arizona. The issue pitted high control costs imposed on
the power facility against aesthetic protection of one of the
nation's most cherished natural wonders. After years of evaluation,
in 1991, the EPA issued a proposed rule that would have required
a seventy percent reduction in sulfur emissions based on thirty-day
averages. 39 The proposed rule would have required an estimated
$2 billion in compliance costs for NGS, but it still fell short of en-
vironmental groups' goal of a ninety percent reduction based on
three-hour averages."4 The EPA subsequently facilitated a nego-
tiation process involving the environmental groups and the NGS
owners for the purpose of developing other possible approach-
es.14' Because the agency had already staked out a position that
deference by a reviewing court. Compare Wald, supra note 13, at 23 ("While consensus
certainly may be an important factor in pursuing the meaning of [the arbitrary and capri-
cious] standard, it is doubtful that consensus can displace the traditional judicial gloss
which has accumulated over the past forty years."), with Philip J. Harter, The Role of
Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENvTL L.
51, 64 (1986) ("[lIt may be appropriate for courts to alter their means of ensuring that
agency action is not arbitrary or capricious if the rule is the product of regulatory negoti-
ation."), and Derek Raymond McDonald, Note, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking,
12 REv. LrIG. 467, 480 (1993) ("Commentators promoting the use of negotiated
rulemaking procedures by agencies have advocated that courts should alter their standard
of review to encourage regulatory negotiation."). The Negotiated Rulemaking Act pro-
vides that "[a] rule which is the product of negotiated rulemaking and is subject to judi-
cial review shall not be accorded any greater deference by a court than a rule which is
the product of other rulemaking procedures." 5 U.S.C. § 570.
138. The EPA does not include the Grand Canyon visibility rules on its list of negoti-
ated rulemakings conducted by the agency, nor does ACUS list it as a negotiated
rulemaking in its reports. See Negotiated Rulemaking at EPA, supra note 118; ACUS,
BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 12, at 55-63; 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at
387-95. The EPA did not invoke the procedures of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in
this rulemaking. The process of negotiation occurred after, rather than before, the publi-
cation of a proposed rule and the close of the comment period on that proposal.
139. See Revision of the Visibility FIP for Arizona, 56 Fed. Reg. 5173, 5178 (1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Feb. 8, 1991) (EPA).
140. See Rappoport & Cooney, supra note 17, at 632.
141. See Revision of the Visibility FIP for Arizona, 56 Fed. Reg. 38,399 (1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (EPA). The agency made no commitment to implement any
approach agreed to by the participants, but instead said it would treat an agreement as
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did not fully reflect either side's interests, each side had a reason
to see if something better could be negotiated.'42 After two
months of intense negotiations, the participants reached an
agreement that would yield a ninety percent reduction based on
full year averages.'43 The EPA published a revised proposal
based on the participants' recommendations and then promulgated
the rule in a highly publicized ceremony with President Bush at
the Grand Canyon."
The Grand Canyon visibility rulemaking has been described
"as a prototype 'win-win' solution of an environmental problem
and a model for other regulatory negotiations."'45 The process
was featured prominently in a front-page New York Times article
on EPA's use of negotiation as an alternative to "the lawsuit sys-
tem."' 6 Yet what has not been reported is that, notwithstanding
the "virtually unprecedented cooperation between the governmen-
tal agency and the directly affected parties,"'47 the Grand Can-
yon visibility rule still ended up in federal court."~ The rule was
challenged not by participants to the negotiation, but by outsiders
to the negotiated rulemaking process: the Central Arizona Water
Conservation District and four other irrigation districts that pur-
chased electricity from NGS, each claiming the visibility rule
would increase their energy costs.149
simply a recommendation. See id. at 38,401.
142. The participants reportedly agreed not to challenge the agency's final rule if it
reflected a negotiated compromise. See Rappoport & Cooney, supra note 17, at 634.
143. See id.
144. See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Revision of the Visi-
bility FIP for Arizona, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,172 (1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (EPA);
see also John E. Yang, Bush Hails Grand Canyon Clean Air Pact, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
1991, at A8; Robert Pear, Bush Hikes in the Grand Canyon, Mixing Politics and Gov-
ernance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at B13.
145. Rappoport & Cooney, supra note 17, at 627.
146. Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Agencies Use Negotiations to Pre-empt Lawsuits Over
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al. More recently, Senator Levin referred to the
rule as one of negotiated rulemaking's success stories in a press release issued by his
office announcing the signing of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996,
which permanently reauthorized the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. See Senator Carl Levin,
Clinton Signs Levin's Bill Encouraging Government Innovation, Congressional Press Re-
leases, Oct. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
147. Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 990 F.2d 1531, 1545 (9th
Cir. 1993).
148. See id. at 1533.
149. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the
rule in a 15 page opinion issued a year and a half after the promulgation of EPA's final
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The same New York Times article that hailed the visibility
rule also referred to EPA's reformulated gasoline rule as a model
of a successful negotiated rulemaking." The 1990 Clean Air Act
required the EPA to issue a rule mandating the use of oxygenated
fuel to reduce urban smog in nonattainment areas. The EPA
chose to use a formal negotiated rulemaking process to develop a
proposal for this rule. The EPA selected representatives from the
automobile, petroleum, and renewable fuel industries, as well as
from the environmental community. After arduous and fragile
negotiations, the parties reached what one report described as a
"nearly litigation-proof agreement."''
Yet in terms of avoiding litigation and eliminating conflict, the
reformulated gasoline rule has turned out to be anything but suc-
cessful. Within ten days of the publication of the final reformulat-
ed gasoline rule in the Federal Register,52 both the American
Petroleum Institute (API) and Texaco, Inc. filed petitions for
judicial review, objecting to a provision in the final rule in which
EPA would publish refiners' individual baseline standards instead
of keeping this information confidential." The American Auto-
mobile Manufacturers Association, the Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers, and the Renewable Fuels Association
intervened in these actions. 54 Following settlement discussions
rule. See id. at 1545.
150. See Wald, supra note 146, at Al. Similarly, in a forthcoming book Edward We-
ber singles out the reformulated gasoline rule as one successful use of "collaborative
games" in environmental policymaking. Edward P. Weber, Pluralism by the Rules: The
Emergence of Collaborative Games in National Pollution Control Politics 111-32 (Jan. 15,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Edward P.
Weber & Anne M. Khademian, From Agitation to Collaboration: Clearing the Air
Through Negotiation, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 396 (1997) (using case study of reformulated
gasoline to argue that regulatory negotiation has increased collaboration and timeliness
while decreasing agitation and delay).
151. Traditional Antagonists Agree On Makeup of Cleaner, Reformulated Fuel, 22 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1141 (Aug. 23, 1991).
152. Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (EPA) [hereinafter Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line Standards].
153. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 94-1138 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 24,
1994); Texaco, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1143 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 1994). The Texaco
petition was jointly filed by Star Enterprise. See id. All of the petitions reported in notes
153, 156, 158, 161 and the accompanying text specifically challenged the reformulated
gasoline rule cited in note 152.
154. See Clerk's Order Allowing Non-Party Motion to Intervene, American Petroleum
Inst. v. EPA, No. 94-1138 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 15, 1994).
1290 [Vol. 46:1255
ASSESSING CONSENSUS
and an out-of-court agreement reached with the petitioners, EPA
proposed and promulgated a revision to the final rule under which
EPA would release only part of the baseline information and
would treat claims of business confidentiality in accordance with
the agency's ordinary standards for protecting confidentiality.'
Two other petroleum companies filed petitions raising objec-
tions to the reformulated gasoline rule. First, Fina Oil and
Chemical Company objected to the individual baseline assigned to
it in the rule.5 6 In response, EPA agreed to adjust Fina's base-
line in an administrative proceeding.5 7 Second, Amerada Hess
Corporation filed a judicial review petition objecting to the limits
EPA placed on fuel parameters.'58 The final rule relied on both
a "simple model" and a "complex model" to establish fuel param-
eters. Amerada Hess argued that the limits EPA placed under the
"simple model" were inconsistent with those under the "complex
model."'5 9 EPA acknowledged the error and issued a direct final
rule amending portions of the reformulated gasoline rule to ad-
dress these concerns. 60
Although both of these petroleum companies were in theory
represented on the Clean Fuel Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
by other petroleum companies and by API, one petitioner chal-
lenging the reformulated gasoline rule had no direct or indirect
representative on the committee. The National Tank Truck Carri-
ers (NTIC), a trade association representing about 200 common
carrier fuel transporters, also filed a petition for review against
EPA.'61 NTTC objected to provisions of the final reformulated
gasoline rule that held common carrier tank truck companies liable
155. See Proposed Revisions to Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Standards, 60
Fed. Reg. 40,009 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (proposed Aug. 4, 1995)
(EPA); Modifications in the Treatment of Business Information Submitted Concerning
Individual Baselines, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,571 (1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (EPA).
156. See Fina Oil and Chem. Co. v. EPA, No. 94-1142 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25,
1994).
157. See Status Report of Respondent Environmental Protection Agency at 2, Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 94-1138 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 1995) (status report for
consolidated cases including No. 94-1142).
158. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. EPA, No. 94-1319 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 15, 1994).
159. See Statement of Issues to be Raised on Appeal at 1, Amerada Hess Corp. v.
EPA, No. 94-1319 (D.C. Cir. filed May 25, 1994).
160. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,944 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (EPA).
161. See National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1323 (D.C. Cir. filed
Apr. 18, 1994).
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if fuel they transported for refiners did not meet the standards set
out in the rule.62 NTTC argued that the Clean Air Act granted
EPA the authority to establish fuel standards but not the authority
to regulate the transportation of reformulated fuels.6' It also ar-
gued that the final rule denied common carriers' equal protection
rights because it left private carriers and jobbers immune from
liability without any rational basis."6 Following the submittal of
NTTC's brief but before EPA submitted its response, both parties
reached a settlement agreement under which the EPA would
revise the final reformulated gasoline rule.'6 The judicial pro-
ceedings have been held in abeyance pending the implementation
of the settlement agreement. As of early 1997, these revisions
were still undergoing the intra-agency review process before being
proposed in the Federal Register.'6
The litigation challenging the reformulated gasoline rule was
only one manifestation of the persistence of conflict, notwithstand-
ing the agency's efforts to secure consensus. The reformulated
gasoline rule also distinguished itself by prompting intense public
criticism. While few EPA regulations receive attention in the pop-
ular media (even in elite papers such as the New York Times),16
the reformulated gasoline rule splashed across the papers following
the introduction of the new fuel." Citizens reported headaches
and dizziness associated with methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE),
162. See Brief of Petitioner at 1-5, National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. EPA, No.
94-1323 (D.C. Cir. June 1, 1995).
163. See id. at 11-33.
164. See id. at 33-39.
165. See Joint Motion to Vacate the Briefing Schedule and Stay Proceedings at 2, Na-
tional Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1323 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 1995).
166. See Status Report of Respondent EPA at 2, National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.
v. EPA, No. 94-1323 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 27, 1997).
167. See Cary Coglianese & Margaret Howard, Getting the Message Out: Regulatory
Policy and the Press 7-18 (1997) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1997 Ameri-
can Political Science Association meeting, Washington, D.C.) (on file with author).
168. See, eg., Agis Salpukas, New Gas Arouses Grass-Roots Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1995, at A37; David Ivanovich, "Cleaner" Fuel Sparks Populist Revolt/Woes Over Refor-
mulated Gas, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1995, at Al; Daniel P. Jones & Matthew Daly,
Some Question Safety of "Clean-Air Gasoline," HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 25, 1995, at
Al; Joyce Price, Cleaner Fuel May Generate Ill Effects, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at
Al; Rogers Worthington, In Wisconsin, Cleaner Gasoline Has a Somewhat Soiled Reputa-
tion, CHI. TRm., Feb. 27, 1995, at 3; New Fuel Mandated by the EPA has Many Motor-
ists Sputtering, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 24, 1995, at A10; Reformulated Gas: New
Fuel Becoming a "Hot-Button Issue " GREENWIRE, Feb. 21, 1995, spotlight story, available
in LEXIS, Environmental Library, Curnws File.
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the additive used to comply with the new standards. Others com-
plained about higher fuel prices. To this day, press reports about
the rule continue, though now they focus on cases of groundwater
contamination with MTBE, a substance which is reported to be a
possible carcinogen. 169
The API also subsequently challenged the final reformulated
gasoline rule in an administrative action. It argued that the second
phase of nitrogen oxide restrictions in the reformulated gasoline
was inconsistent with the negotiated agreement and the Clean Air
Act.' Although EPA claimed that only the first phase restric-
tions were addressed by the negotiated rulemaking committee, it
responded to API's petition by soliciting further comments on that
portion of the rule.'7' Eventually, EPA rejected API's adminis-
trative motion arguing that the second phase restrictions were
ruled out by neither the negotiated agreement nor the Clean Air
Act. 72
Finally, the reformulated gasoline rule also earned the distinc-
tion of being the first U.S. regulation struck down by the World
Trade Organization. Venezuela and Brazil successfully challenged
the foreign refiner baseline provisions in the reformulated gasoline
rule as discriminatory and in violation of trade rules. 73 The
169. See, eg., William Carlsen, Gas Additive's Needless Risk: MTBE Appears to be
Tainting Water Without Cleaning Air, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1997, at Al; Chris Bowman,
"Clean Gas" Leaves Water Utilities with Bad Taste, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 10, 1997, at
Al; Chris Bowman, MTBE in Drinking Water, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 21, 1997, at B6;
Chris Bowman, Ugly By-Product of Smog Busting Gas: Lake Pollution, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 14, 1997, at Al; Perceived Merits, Demerits of MTBE Still Argued, OIL & GAS
J., Apr. 17, 1995, at 22; Mark Emond, Widespread Health Complaints About RFG, MTBE
Raise Concerns Over Program's Fate, NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Apr. 1995, at 35.
170. See Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,960 (EPA 1996) (peti-
tion for reconsideration; request for comment); Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, 62
Fed. Reg. 11,346 (EPA 1997) (denial of petition for reconsideration).
171. See Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, 61 Fed. Reg. at 35,962.
172. See Standards for Reformulated Gasoline, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,350.
173. See World Trade Organization, Doc. No. WT/DS2/R, reprinted in World Trade
Organization: Report of Panel in United States-Standards for Reformulated Gasoline and
Conventional Gasoline, 35 LL.M. 274, 279-91 (1996); see also Kantor Says He's Inclined
to Appeal Panel's Ruling in Venezuelan Gas Case, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 100 (Jan.
24, 1996) (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor as saying that he intends to
appeal the adverse WTO panel finding on reformulated gasoline); Appellate Body Faults
U.S. in Gas Cas4 But Reverses on Conservation Exception, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
703 (May 1, 1996) (discussing ruling of WTO's Appellate Body); Appellate Body Formally
Adopts Ruling Against U.S. Gasoline Rules, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 833 (May 22,
1996) (discussing WTO's Dispute Settlement Body's acceptance of ruling by Appellate
Body); Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision on U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations, 13
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EPA was forced to revisit issues in the reformulated gasoline rule
again, issuing a revised rule more than three years after publishing
its original final rule.7 4 A rule that has been heralded as one of
negotiated rulemaking's success stories demonstrates instead that
the achievement of an initial consensus by no means guarantees
the elimination of controversy. 75
The reformulated gasoline rule and the Grand Canyon visibili-
ty rule are but two illustrations that negotiated rulemaking is no
panacea for conflict in the regulatory process. 76 In addition to
the challenges filed against EPA rules, several of the Department
of Education's negotiated rules have ended up in court. Student
loan regulations, promulgated using negotiated rulemaking, have
been challenged at both the district and appellate court levels.'77
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 459 (Mar. 13, 1996) (analyzing the WTO's decision).
174. Baseline Requirements for Gasoline Produced by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg.
45,533 (1997) (EPA); see also United States Promises WTO Changes in Reformulated Gas.
oline Rules, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 548, 548 (Mar. 26, 1997); Options to Meet Clean
Air, WTO Goals Sought by EPA After Gas Decision Rule, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1143, 1143 (July 10, 1996).
175. All of the petitions for review discussed in the text accompanying notes 153-74
challenged the reformulated gasoline rule and were therefore distinct from petitions filed
against the EPA's accompanying renewable oxygenates rule-a rule which was ultimately
struck down by the D.C. Circuit. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The American Petroleum Institute (API) successfully argued that
the agency's 30% mandate for ethanol contravened the Clean Air Act. See id. at 1119.
The court subsequently awarded API $237,997.03 in attorneys fees. See American Petro-
leum Inst. v. EPA, 72 F.3d 907, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
176. Cf. Harter, supra note 21, at 489 ("Consensual rulemaking is certainly not a
panacea."). A negotiated rulemaking process also failed to stop a legal proceeding against
the EPA in Pennsylvania. After EPA rejected the State of Pennsylvania's water stan-
dards, Pennsylvania established a negotiated rulemaking process to develop new standards
that would meet EPA's approval. However, the Raymond Proffitt Foundation, a Penn-
sylvania advocacy group, proceeded with a citizen suit it had filed seeking to compel the
EPA to issue federal standards. A month after Pennsylvania said the reg neg process
would conclude (but still before the state issued any final standards), the district court
ordered EPA to set its own standards "immediately and without further delay." Raymond
Proffitt Found. v. EPA, 930 F. Supp. 1088, 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
177. See USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996) (chal-
lenging third party student loan servicer provisions); Career College Ass'n v. Riley, 74
F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (challenging financial responsibility provisions); Career College
Ass'n v. Riley, No. 94-1372, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,232 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1994) (chal-
lenging financial responsibility provisions); Career College Ass'n v. Riley, No. 94-5213,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31,486 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 29, 1995) (per curiam) (challenging non-
federal revenue source requirement for profit trade schools); Career College Ass'n v.
Riley, No. 94-1214, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10,214 (D.D.C. July 19, 1994) (challenging
non-federal revenue source requirement for proprietary trade schools); Ponce Paramedical
College, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 303 (D.P.R. 1994) (challeng-
1997] ASSESSING CONSENSUS 1295
In contrast to the conventional view that negotiated rulemaking
has eliminated legal challenges to federal regulations, 78 it is
plain that such challenges still arise even after an agency has used
a negotiated rulemaking procedure.
Of course, the fact that groups have challenged some negoti-
ated rules does not fully respond to the claim that a consensus-
based approach reduces the frequency of litigation.7 9 To deter-
mine whether the litigation rate for negotiated rules is notably
lower than that for conventional rules, as the NPR report suggest-
ed, it is first necessary to determine the actual litigation rate for
ing eligibility provisions for proprietary schools).
178. See, e.g., John Dunlop, The Emergence of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
and Negotiated Rule-Making 84 (Feb. 6, 1997) (unpublished book chapter on file with
the Duke Law Journal) ("The experience in agencies that have utilized negotiations to
formulate regulations is that subsequent litigation over the rules is almost eliminated.").
179. That negotiated rules engender any litigation at all is certainly surprising given
the intuitive and statutory meaning of "consensus," as well as the overwhelming purpose
of negotiated rulemaking found in the scholarly literature and legislative history. Interest-
ingly, the individual most instrumental in the development of negotiated rulemaking,
Philip Harter, might not be surprised that litigation has occurred over negotiated rules.
Although in his seminal article Harter did speculate that "negotiations may reduce judi-
cial challenges" to agency rules, Harter, supra note 12, at 102, he argued that "the prime
benefit of direct negotiations is that it enables the participants to focus squarely on their
respective interests," id. at 29. Harter accurately predicted that "[s]ome parties, of course,
would seek judicial review of rules developed through a regulatory negotiation process."
Id. at 102. Several years later, he again observed that even though he knew of no nego-
tiated rules that had been challenged at that time, "that surely will not continue forever."
Harter, supra note 137, at 54. More recently, though, Harter has shifted his tone in a
way that contributes to the mistaken belief that negotiated rules avoid litigation. In a
1993 article he co-authored, Harter described the negotiated rulemaking process as a
means of "preventing lawsuits down the road," and stated that "[t]o date . . .no rule
crafted in this manner has been subjected to court action." Philip Harter & Daniel
Finkelstein, The Coke Ovens' Regulatory Negotiation: From Choking Controversy to Con-
sensus Relief, 2 J. ENVTL. PERMnITING 343, 345 (1993). Several years later, Harter of-
fered a carefully crafted statement in support of negotiated rulemaking in testimony be-
fore Congress: "As further indication of the success of the process, there has never been
a judicial challenge to a negotiated rule that was issued by the agency intact." 1996
Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 81, at 69 (statement of Philip Harter on behalf of
the American Bar Association). In that same congressional testimony, Harter seemed to
imply that negotiated rulemaking has reduced litigation when he asserted that negotiated
rules result in cost savings, despite the up-front resources they demand: "Considering the
costs of litigation for both the regulated community and the government, these savings
are considerable." Id. at 68. Of course, Harter's recent statements, even in their more
careful formulation, are not accurate because outside parties have challenged negotiated
rules that participants in the regulatory negotiations found acceptable. See supra text
accompanying notes 149, 161 and infra note 233 and accompanying text.
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conventional rules. Since the EPA has often been used as the
benchmark, I use the EPA for purposes of my analysis as well.
It has been widely believed that interest groups challenge
virtually every EPA regulation in court.8 In arguing that judi-
cial review has imposed undesirable costs on agency management,
for example, political scientist James Q. Wilson emphasized that
"[o]ver 80 percent of the three hundred or so regulations EPA
issues each year wind up in the courts."'' Making a similar ar-
gument, Philip Howard invoked this statistic in his best-selling
critique of the modem regulatory state."s As Appendix D
shows, the belief that 80 percent of EPA rules get challenged in
court has woven its way into an exhaustive body of work by jour-
nalists, governmental officials, and scholars."s
The original source of the 80 percent statistic has remained
largely obscure."s The statistic, which originated in speeches giv-
en by William Ruckelshaus,'" has been attributed at different
180. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 367 (1986) ("[V]irtually every regulation issued by such
agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration is challenged in court either by environmental and consumer
groups or by industry.").
181. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY Do IT 284 (1989).
182. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFO-
CATING AMERICA 87 (1994) ("[M]ost decisions are appealed in the courts, including 80
percent of the EPA's decisions ....").
183. Ordinarily, it would suffice to cite a few sources here to illustrate that others
have stated that 80 percent of EPA's regulations end up in court. Yet doing so would
fail to convey the full extent to which the belief in an 80% litigation rate has permeated
the literature. The pervasiveness of this belief-and its persistence over time--can hardly
be overstated. Accordingly, Appendix D provides a bibliography of many, but by no
means all, of the sources which advance the claim that outside groups challenge the
overwhelming majority of EPA regulations. Additional references to the 80% litigation
rate can be found throughout the legislative history of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act.
See supra notes 45, 48, 49, 54 and accompanying text.
184. See KERWIN, supra note 18, at 120 n.55 ("The origins of this statistic are ob-
scure, but it has been quoted extensively in EPA training manuals.").
185. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection" A Brief History of the
Environmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVTL L. 455, 463
(1984-85) ("Eighty percent of what the agency does is finally decided either in a negoti-
ated or formal court decision."); William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Risks and Lia-
bilities-Identifcation, Assessment and Management, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 19 (1987)
("[E]ighty percent" of EPA's "decisions, rules, regulations, and judgments" end up in
court). More recently Ruckelshaus noted:
As is well known, nearly every major EPA decision ends up in the judicial
system .... The result has been that most of the environmental protections
that are actually (rather than theoretically) put into place are the result not of
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times to at least two other EPA administrators: Lee Thomas'86
and William Reilly." Part of the ambiguity of the 80 percent
statistic stems from confusion about precisely what it means. In
some accounts the 80 percent figure purports to be the litigation
rate for all EPA "decisions;"' 88 in others it is the rate for all
EPA "rules" or "regulations;"'" and in still others it represents
the litigation rate for all "nonroutine" or "major" rules." Some-
times the 80 percent rate has even been inflated to 85 percent.'9'
Amazingly, no EPA analyses underlay the origin of this statis-
tic, even though it has taken on a life of its own.Y In order to
the deliberations of scientists or engineers or elected representatives or respon-
sible appointed officials, but of consent decrees handed down by judges.
William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 25, 27.
186. Thomas, supra note 29, at 3 ("We found that over three-quarters of our regula-
tions once promulgated were litigated."); see also Miller, supra note 29, at 20 (quoting
Thomas that "[flully 80% of the rules EPA issues are challenged.")
187. See, e.g., ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE EPA 17 (1993) ("Reilly once estimated that 80 percent of his decisions were
appealed to the courts."); Jeffrey M. Berry, Citizen Groups and the Changing Nature of
Interest Group Politics in America, 528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL & SOC. SCL 30, 38
(1993) (quoting Reilly that four out of five decisions he makes end up in court); Wald,
supra note 146, at Al (quoting Reilly as stating that "[flour of every five decisions I
make are contested in court.").
188. See Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the
Pitfalls, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 211, 216 (Norman J. Vig & Michael
E. Kraft eds., 1990) ("80 percent of environmental regulatory decisions are appealed in
court."); GEORGE HOBERG, PLURALISM BY DESIGN: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 199 (1992) ("[F]ully 80 percent of EPA's final decisions
are the subject of judicial appeal").
189. See, eg., KERWIN, supra note 18, at 116 ("The Environmental Protection Agency
has estimated that some 80 percent of its rules stimulate lawsuits by dissatisfied par-
ties."); Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 249 n.2
("[O]ver 80% of EPA's regulations are challenged in court.").
190. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk- Are Courts Part of the Solution or
Most of the Problem, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 624 (1994) ("Eighty percent of all major
Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA') rules are litigated in court."); Richard J. Laza-
rus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 324 (stating that EPA "has had 80 to 85
percent of its major regulations challenged in court.").
191. See, e.g., KERWIN, supra note 18, at 264 ("The Office of General Counsel at the
Environmental Protection Agency estimates that 85 percent of the hundreds of
nonroutine rules issued by the EPA each year are challenged in court."); COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 3 (1985) ("Fully 85 percent of EPA's regula-
tions result in litigation."); WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BE-
TRAYAL OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 110 (quoting William Ruckelshaus that "'85 percent
of the decisions made by the EPA administrator that are appealable were appealed"').
192. Interviews with EPA staff members who served under Administrator Ruckelshaus
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test the validity of the statistic, I collected data from the EPA's
litigation docket as well as from the dockets at the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 93 The EPA do-
ckets included litigation filed against the agency in any federal
court during 1987-1991. During this time, the EPA issued 1568
rules and was named as a defendant in 411 cases in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, where rule challenges must be filed.194 The
major environmental statutes typically require that petitions for
judicial review be filed within a few months after the EPA pro-
mulgates a rule,195 so most petitions for review of a rule are
filed in the year when the rule is published. Some small portion of
suits are not filed in the same year as the rule, but aggregating
the entire five-year period minimizes any error due to such a time
lag.
The litigation rate for rules issued during the 1987-1991 peri-
od covered by the EPA docket, even conservatively calculated,
turned out to be much lower than widely believed: only 26 per-
cent of rules issued were challenged. In calculating this rate, I
have used what I take to be the most realistic estimate for EPA
rules. I have relied on a computer search of the Federal Register
which specifically excluded those rules that were minor corrections,
technical amendments, or clarifications of other rules. 96 When
confirmed that no systematic analysis underlay this claim. Rather, it was based on a ball-
park estimate of the number of rules published in the agency's regulatory agenda and a
similar estimate of the number of petitions for review handled by the Office of General
Counsel. To ensure candor, I conducted all interviews on a not-for-attribution basis.
193. A fuller description of my research methods is contained in Cary Coglianese,
Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative Process 198-221
(1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
194. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6976 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (1994); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a) (1994).
195. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994) (60 day period); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1994) (120 day period); Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (1994) (90 day period); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-7 (1994) (45 day period); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1994) (60 day period); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2618(a)(1) (1994) (60 day period).
196. My most restrictive search of the Fedreg file in LEXIS, which excluded correc-
tions and technical amendments, yielded 1568 rules for the years 1987-1991. In compari-
son, my broadest LEXIS search, which retrieved all final actions which could be chal-
lenged in court, yielded 1964 rules (a litigation rate of 20.9%). Although corrections or
technical amendments could be independently challenged, these were excluded because
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other available estimates of the total number of EPA rules were
used, the litigation rate dropped even lower. For instance, using
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) data on the number of
final EPA rules promulgated during the same time period, the
litigation rate amounted to only 19 percent-precisely the opposite
of the rate widely assumed."9
As is sometimes acknowledged, the 80 percent figure was not
originally intended to describe the rate at which all EPA rules
were litigated, but only those rules significant enough to be pub-
lished in the EPA's semiannual Regulatory Agenda.' Since the
rules appearing in the Regulatory Agenda are by definition more
significant,' the litigation rate can be expected to be higher
than that for all EPA rules. Unfortunately, the EPA docket data
do not permit one to distinguish between suits involving those
rules that are listed in the Regulatory Agenda and those that are
not. Therefore I used court records from the D.C. Circuit to de-
any such challenge would likely be consolidated with a challenge to the rule being cor-
rected or amended. In addition to their relative lack of independent policy importance,
corrections and technical amendments are usually actions that resolve problems outside
groups have brought to the agency's attention and thus are unlikely to be challenged in
the first place.
197. Adding together the data reported annually in Exhibit 19 to Appendix IV of the
OMB's annual Regulatory Program of the United States, EPA issued 2162 rules during
this period. In addition, a search of another leading electronic source of Federal Register
documents, the Legi-Slate database, revealed a total of 2212 final rules (for a rate of
18.6 percent). Thus, my restrictive LEXIS search yields the least number of rules and the
highest litigation rate.
198. See supra note 192.
199. Listings in the Regulatory Agenda include rules that have an annual economic
impact of $100 million or more or are considered economically significant. See Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193, 13,196-97 (1981) (revoked by Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (not significantly
altering economic impact guidelines)). They also include rules that are otherwise consid-
ered "significant" by the agencies. For the EPA, "significant" rules are those expected to
have important economic or environmental impacts, or to present difficult administrative
tasks for the agency. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA
Rulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 72 n.44. The definition of
"significant regulatory action" includes actions that have an economic impact of $100
million or more or adversely affect the economy in a material way. See Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1994). The only rules excluded are: "[s]pecialized categories of
action (such as EPA approvals of state plans and other actions that do not apply na-
tionally) [and] routine actions (such as pesticide tolerances and minor amendments to
existing regulations)." Regulatory Agenda, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,702, 15,702 (1982). EPA man-
agers do not consider using negotiated rulemaking for such minor or routine rules, but
instead they select among the kinds of significant rules that would be listed in the regu-
latory agenda, the more appropriate comparison group for negotiated rules.
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termine the rate of litigation for significant EPA regulations pro-
mulgated under two major statutes, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Clean Air Act, for the period
1980-1991.' Any suits challenging significant, national rules un-
der these statutes must be filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."' A total of 220
nationally-applicable significant RCRA and Clean Air Act rules
were completed from 1980 to 1991. Of these, petitions for review
were filed against 77, yielding an aggregate litigation rate of 35
percent. As Table 4 shows, Clean Air Act regulations were chal-
lenged less frequently (31%) than RCRA rules (43%) over this
time period.
Table 4. Litigation of Significant Clean Air Act and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act Rules, 1980-1991
CAA RCRA Total
Rules 141 79 220
Challenges 43 34 77
Litigation Rate 31% 43% 35%
Note: The "Rules" row lists the totals of all nationally-applicable rules that the EPA
considered significant enough to merit listing in its semi-annual regulatory agendas.
These totals include those rules classified as "major" under Executive Order 12,291 as
well as other non-minor and non-routine rules. The "Challenges" row lists the subset of
rules over which one or more affected parties filed a petition for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Since not all petitions for review reach an
appellate panel for a decision which can be reported, data on filings were obtained from
the docket records at the D.C. Circuit.
Although conventional wisdom and the legislative history of
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act suggest that only a minority of
EPA rules escape litigation, a closer look at the available data
200. Even though my sample includes rules issued under only two of EPA's dozen or
so statutes, these rules made up about a third of all significant EPA rules published dur-
ing the same time period.
201. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
6976(a)(1) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994).
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indicates that the prevailing view has things backwards. The ma-
jority of EPA rules escape litigation, with petitions for review filed
for at most about a quarter of them. The litigation rate for signifi-
cant rules under two major statutes is somewhat higher-35 per-
cent-but still well under the 80 percent rate that scholars have
previously cited. More than previously thought, litigation over
EPA rules occurs selectively, if not infrequently.' z
How does EPA's track record for negotiated rules compare
with its track record for rules overall? The National Performance
Review's 20 percent litigation rate was based on an incomplete
review of the first ten negotiated rulemakings finalized by
EPA.' However, when all twelve of these rules are included,
and when a more complete search of court records is made, the
actual litigation rate is much higher. On the basis of my review of
records at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, at least six of EPA's
twelve finalized rules developed using negotiated rulemaking have
been subject to petitions for judicial review filed in federal
court.34 The challenged regulations include those addressing: 1)
202. The findings I report here are consistent with those of other empirical studies of
litigation and the regulatory process. Christine Harrington reports aggregate data on ad-
ministrative appeals showing that "[t]he pace of regulatory litigation has not increased
sharply in the last fifteen years nor has judicial support for agency rules weakened."
Harrington, supra note 21, at 305. In their study of nearly 700 EPA rules issued under
RCRA, James Hamilton and Christopher Schroeder found that only 21.8% of the rules
had been subject to a court remand or consent decree. See James T. Hamilton & Chris-
topher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The
Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1994, at 111, 153.
203. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 32 n.7.
204. Of the other six rules for which I found no evidence of ensuing legal actions,
four were issued under the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act. Both statutes require any challenges to nationally-applicable rules to be filed in the
D.C. Circuit Court within a defined time period following the publication of the final
rule. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. The remaining two rules were issued
under the authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
which vests review of rulemakings in the district courts and does not impose a time limi-
tation on the filing of a petition for review. See 7 U.S.C. § 136n(a) (1994). For these
rules, I conducted searches in case reports, relevant looseleaf services, and the docket of
the District Court for the District of Columbia. Furthermore, I contacted lawyers who
might have filed such cases or have known of such filings. I found no evidence that
either of these FIFRA rules had yet been the subject of a petition for judicial review.
That said, one of these rulemakings, the worker protection standard, has been a subject
of considerable controversy since its promulgation. EPA issued a final rule after a failed
attempt to achieve full consensus among all the parties to the original negotiated
rulemaking committee. See 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102 (1992). That final rule has been met with
congressional and presidential intervention, threats of litigation, and numerous agency
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asbestos in school buildings; 5 2) the underground injection of
hazardous wastes; 3) reformulated fuels;-, 4) chemical equip-
ment emissions leaks;' 5) wood furniture coatings;' and 6)
the collection of information on disinfectant byproducts.210
I have already discussed the judicial challenges filed against
the EPA's reformulated gasoline rule, challenges which involved
both participants in the negotiated rulemaking process, such as the
American Petroleum Institute, as well as outsiders like the Nation-
al Tank Truck Carriers.21' The additional challenged reg negs
show that a similar set of actors filed petitions for review. Many
petitioners have been participants in the negotiated rulemaking
proceedings. However, sometimes the petitioners were not mem-
bers of the rulemaking committee, as with the Grand Canyon
visibility rule and reformulated gasoline rule. One additional
rule-the wood furniture coating regulation-drew petitions from
trade associations that were not represented on the negotiated
rulemaking committee. 2 A brief review of these additional chal-
lenges demonstrates the range of petitions filed over negotiated
rules.
0 Asbestos in School Buildings. The EPA used negotiated
rulemaking to establish methods for public schools to follow in
identifying and mitigating asbestos exposure. 3 After the EPA
revisions and proposed revisions. See supra note 111.
205. See Safe Bldgs. Alliance v. EPA, 846 F.2d 79, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
206. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
207. See National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1323 (D.C. Cir. filed
Apr. 18, 1994); Amerada Hess Corp. v. EPA, No. 94-1319 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 15,
1994); Fina Oil & Chem. Co., Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1142 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 1994);
Texaco, Inc. v. EPA, No. 94-1143 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 25, 1994); American Petroleum
Inst. v. EPA, No. 94-1138 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 24, 1994) (D.C. Cir. voluntary dismissal
granted Feb. 23, 1996).
208. See Dow Chem. Co. v. EPA, No. 94-1465 (D.C. Cir filed June 21, 1994); Chemi-
cal Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir. filed June 21, 1994).
209. See Halogenated Solvents Indus. Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, No. 96-1036 (D.C. Cir.
filed Feb. 5, 1996); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. EPA, No. 96-1038 (D.C. Cir. filed
Feb. 5, 1996); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1031 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 2, 1996).
210. See American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1208 (D.C. Cir. filed June 21,
1996).
211. See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
213. See Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826 (1987) (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763) (EPA) [hereinafter Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools].
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promulgated its final rule, the Safe Buildings Alliance (an asbestos
industry trade association), two building products manufacturers,
and two individuals filed petitions for review. 14 A third building
products company, GAF Corporation, intervened in the case, as
did the American Association of School Administrators and
various state attorneys general.215 Although the Safe Buildings
Alliance had signed the limited consensus statement which
concluded the negotiated rulemaking, 16 the industry nevertheless
challenged the rationality of EPA's action, specifically objecting to
its failure to define a safe level of asbestos exposure and arguing
that its decision to allow the removal of asbestos would raise the
level of asbestos fibers in the air.217 The arguments were briefed
and presented to a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court, which in the
end upheld the rule against all the challenges.1
* Underground Injection of Hazardous Wastes. The EPA's
underground injection rule established standards for the use of
underground methods for disposing of and storing hazardous
wastes. 9 After EPA completed the rulemaking, five petitions
were filed by interests represented in the negotiated rulemaking,
including the waste treatment industry, the chemical industry, and
an environmental group.' These petitions were consolidated and
three major trade associations-the American Petroleum Institute,
the American Iron and Steel Institute, and the Institute for
Chemical Waste Management-intervened in the case.'
The chemical industry challenged the rule's permitting process,
its application of the statute's "no migration" standard, and the
agency definition of "no migration," which included even the
migration of hazardous constituents of hazardous wastes. 222 The
214. See Safe Bldgs. Alliance v. EPA, 846 F.2d 79, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
215. See id.
216. See Participants and Facilitators Discuss Negotiation of EPA's Proposed Rule on
Asbestos in Schools, 1 Alternative Disp. Resol. Rep. (BNA) 154, 157 (July 23, 1987).
217. See Safe Bldgs. Alliance, 846 F.2d at 83, 84.
218. See id. at 80, 85.
219. See Underground Injection Control Program: Hazardous Waste Disposal Injection
Restrictions, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,118, 28,118 (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 144, 146,
148) (EPA).
220. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
221. See iL
222. See id. at 1153-58.
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Natural Resources Defense Council and the Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council also challenged the EPA's application of the
"no migration" standard, arguing that it should apply to the seep-
age of hazardous constituents from otherwise non-hazardous
waste.' Petitioners also challenged the rule's definition of "in-
jection zone" and its standards for injection into salt domes, un-
derground mines, and caves.' A panel of the D.C. Circuit up-
held the rule against all but one of the challenges, remanding the
standards for salt domes, mines, and caves for a finding that these
standards satisfied the statutory requirements.'
* Chemical Equipment Leaks. The equipment leaks rule was
designed to control releases of hazardous emissions from valves,
flanges, and other connecting points in chemical manufacturing
facilities.226 Through a series of negotiation sessions, the
participating chemical companies and environmental groups
reached an agreement on procedures for monitoring leaks. Before
the agency could promulgate the rule, Congress passed am-
endments to the Clean Air Act and the EPA incorporated the
negotiated agreement into a broader set of national emissions
standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAP) generated by
the chemical industry. The final rule, known as the Hazardous
Organic NESHAP, or HON rule for short, regulated releases from
heat exchange systems, wastewater streams, process vents, and
storage vessels, as well as from equipment leaks.227 The
equipment leaks portion of the rule remained largely as the
negotiated rulemaking committee had agreed.
Following the promulgation of the final rule, the Chemical
Manufacturers Association and Dow Chemical Company, both of
whom were represented in the negotiated rulemaking, filed peti-
tions for review challenging numerous aspects of the HON
rule.' Although most of their objections were leveled at aspects
223. See id at 1152, 1159-62.
224. See id at 1162-65.
225. See iL at 1165-66.
226. See National Emission Standards for Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants, 59 Fed.
Reg. 19,402 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (EPA) [hereinafter HON Rule].
227. See id.
228. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir. filed June 21, 1994);
Dow Chem. Co. v. EPA, No. 94-1465 (D.C. Cir. filed June 21, 1994). These cases were
consolidated by order of the court on Oct. 24, 1994. The American Forest & Paper
Association, a trade association from outside the chemical industry and not a member of
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of the rule which were not subject to the negotiated rulemaking,
they also raised concerns about certain parts of subpart H, the
equipment leaks portion of the final rule. The petitioners and the
EPA entered settlement discussions within a few months and
eventually reached an agreement on dozens of changes to the final
rule.229 The agency subsequently promulgated revisions to
subpart H of the rule, including changes to the control options for
leaks from compressors, an issue that had been overlooked by the
chemical industry during the negotiations.3"
* Wood Furniture Coatings. Like the HON rule, the wood
furniture coatings rule established national emissions standards for
hazardous air pollutants3 1 The negotiated rulemaking process
brought together representatives from the wood furniture industry,
suppliers of wood coatings, and environmental groups. During
these negotiations, environmental representatives expressed
concern that the furniture industry might substitute other
potentially hazardous chemicals not specifically covered under the
rule. The parties subsequently agreed to incorporate into the rule
a list of other chemicals (not currently used by the wood coatings
industry) labeled as "of potential concern."23 After EPA
promulgated the final rule, three chemical industry trade as-
sociations not represented in the negotiations filed petitions for
review challenging the listing of additional chemicals as "of poten-
tial concern." 3 As of November, 1996, the EPA was engaged in
settlement discussions with the Chemical Manufacturers
Association, the Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance, and the
Society of Plastics Industry over this issue.'
the negotiated rulemaking committee, intervened in this litigation. See Clerk's Order
Granting Non-Party Motion to Intervene, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 94-1463
(D.C. Cir. filed July 29, 1994).
229. See Settlement Agreement, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 30, 1996).
230. See Proposed HON Rule Clarifications, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,698 (1996) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (proposed Aug. 26, 1996) (EPA) [hereinafter Proposed HON
Rule Clarifications]; Final HON Rule Clarifications, 62 Fed. Reg. 2722 (1997) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (EPA) [hereinafter Final HON Rule Clarifications].
231. See Wood Furniture Manufacturing Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,930 (1995) (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63) (EPA).
232. See id. at 62,951 tbl.6.
233. See Halogenated Solvents Indus. Alliance v. EPA, No. 96-1036 (D.C. Cir. filed
Feb. 5, 1996); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. EPA, No. 96-1038 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb.
5, 1996); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1031 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 2, 1996).
234. See Joint Status Report at 2, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1031 (D.C.
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* Disinfectant Byproducts. The most recently challenged reg
neg established monitoring requirements that allow the EPA to
collect data on drinking water quality. To control microbial
contamination, water suppliers treat drinking water with
disinfectants. Responding to concerns about the chemical by-
products created when disinfectants react with chemicals already in
the water, the EPA convened a negotiated rulemaking proceeding
to develop enhanced standards for microbials and new standards
for disinfectant byproducts. The negotiations resulted in two
proposed rules on disinfectant byproducts and water treatment, 2 5
and a final rule governing the collection of information the agency
needs before finalizing the two proposed rules. 6
Following EPA's promulgation of the information collection
rule, the American Water Works Association (AWWA), a mem-
ber of the rulemaking committee, reported that it "was surprised
and disappointed by some significant provisions of the regula-
tion."" AWWA argued that the EPA established a statistically
unreliable monitoring procedure in its final rule which was not in-
cluded in the proposed rule."8 Faced with a limited statutory
deadline for filing a petition for judicial review, 9 AWWA filed
a petition in the D.C. Circuit Court challenging the information
collection rule.' AWWA objected to the time period for water
suppliers to complete the required monitoring, as well as to the
specific monitoring tests required under the final rule. 41
Cir. Nov. 27, 1996).
235. See Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Requirements, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,832
(1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 & 142) (proposed July 29, 1994); Disinfec-
tions and Disinfection Byproducts, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,668 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 141 & 142) (proposed July 29, 1994).
236. See Drinking Water Information Collection Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (1996)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 141).
237. Future Uncertain for Negotiation Process on Microbials, Disinfection Byproducts,
EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (Sept. 27, 1996) (quoting a letter from
AWWA).
238. See iL at 1194.
239. The Safe Drinking Water Act requires any petitions for review to be made with-
in 45 days of promulgation of the challenged rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(2) (1994).
240. See American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1208 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 6,
1996).
241. See Petitioner's Statement of Issues at 1, American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA,
No. 96-1208 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 1996).
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After several months of discussions with the EPA, AWWA
decided to withdraw its petition. AWWA reported that some of
the issues related to the compliance schedule had been resolved,
and that the EPA was inclined to consider its concerns about the
testing procedure.242 Following the filing of AWWA's petition,
for example, EPA's Science Advisory Board's Drinking Water
Committee met to examine the reliability of the new monitoring
requirements imposed by the agency 43 Given the ongoing na-
ture of the EPA's actions on microbials and disinfectant byprod-
ucts, AWWA decided to pursue its "fundamental disagreement"
with the EPA outside of court and in the context of ongoing
discussions with the agency and other organizations over the final
substantive standards.2 These ongoing discussions with partici-
pants in the negotiated rulemaking have sometimes engendered
disagreement over what the parties actually agreed to in their
negotiations over the substantive drinking water standards.245
As this review of the several challenged EPA rules demon-
strates, negotiated rules are vulnerable to a variety of legal objec-
tions. Participants file judicial petitions when they believe the final
rule is inconsistent with the negotiated agreement or when it con-
tains adverse provisions not addressed by the negotiation.
Nonparticipants also file petitions when a final rule adversely af-
fects their interests. In each of these examples, petitioners chal-
lenged EPA rules notwithstanding the fact that the rules had been
developed using the negotiated rulemaking process!' 4
242. See Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Petition for Review at 1, American Water
Works Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1996); Water Utility Organization
Withdraws Suit on EPA Information Collection Rule, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1465 (Nov.
15, 1996) [hereinafter AWWA Withdraws Suit].
243. See Meeting Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 33,917 (1996) (EPA).
244. See AWWA Withdraws Suit, supra note 242, at 1465. AWWA acted as many par-
ties have in filing so-called "protective petitions" against EPA rules. Given the jurisdic-
tional deadlines for filing petitions for review under statutes such as the Safe Drinking
Water Act, organizations concerned about the content of a final rule often file a petition
just to ensure their right to proceed further if ongoing discussions with agency staff prove
unproductive. See Coglianese, supra note 21, at 761-62 (discussing the filing of "protective
petitions").
245. See Water Organization Recommends That EPA Proceed With Rules On
Microbials, Byproducts, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1576 (Nov. 29, 1996) (reporting Natural
Resource Defense Council's concerns that AWWA had retreated from its agreement on
maximum contaminant levels in the disinfectant byproducts proposal).
246. Some might mistakenly interpose that the petitioners in the reformulated gasoline
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Although only two of the six challenged rules reached an
appellate panel for a decision, this relatively small number of
adjudicated cases is typical of the overall pattern of judicial review
challenges. For all challenges to EPA rules filed in the D.C. Cir-
cuit between 1979-1990, only 29% were resolved through adjudica-
tion before an appellate panel.247 Negotiation and settlement dis-
cussions typically follow the filing of challenges to any EPA rule,
making the process of litigation over regulations compatible with
ongoing cooperation between representatives of litigating organiza-
tions and EPA staff.2 8 In the aggregate, negotiated rulemaking
has not generated any substantial difference in the way that legal
challenges get resolved.24 9
case only challenged the separate renewable oxygenates rule, and, similarly, that the peti-
tioners in the chemical equipment leaks case only challenged unrelated portions of the
HON rule into which the equipment leaks reg neg was merged. Cf. 1995 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 30, at 391 (suggesting that the final rule that was challenged in court differed
from the negotiated rule); KERwiN & LANGBEIN, supra note 89, at 34 ("The rule con-
taining the results of the clean fuels reg neg was also challenged but the issues in ques-
tion were not among those negotiated by the committee."). It is true that the renewable
oxygenates rule was challenged and reversed by the D.C. Circuit. See American Petro-
leum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It is also true that the peti-
tioners in the equipment leaks case raised numerous challenges to subparts F, G, and I
of the HON rule, which did not pertain to equipment leaks. See Proposed HON Rule
Clarifications, supra note 230, at 43,698. However, in both instances, petitioners also chal-
lenged the very rules or portions of rules which EPA did develop using negotiated
rulemaking. In the reformulated gasoline case, one should not confuse the legal challenge
to the renewable oxygenates rule with the several distinct petitions filed challenging the
reformulated gasoline rule which I have described in the text. See supra notes 153-66
and accompanying text. In the challenge to the HON rule, the petitioners raised numer-
ous objections to subpart H which pertains to equipment leaks. See Attachment A to
Settlement Agreement at 102-22, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 30, 1996). These objections led EPA to amend the equipment leaks portion of the
rule in order, among other things, to clarify definitions, allow the use of additional cali-
bration gases, and change the control options for pumps and compressors. See Proposed
HON Rule Clarifications, supra note 230, at 43,698, 43,709; Final HON Rule Clarifica-
tions, supra note 230, at 2786-92. An EPA official involved in the equipment leaks reg
neg reported to me in a background interview that he knew during the negotiations that
the chemical industry was overlooking issues related to the compressors, an oversight that
the industry subsequently sought to correct in the context of its judicial challenge.
247. During the period 1979-1990, 969 petitions for review challenging EPA rules
were filed in the D.C. Circuit. These were consolidated into 322 cases, of which 93
(29%) were resolved through adjudication, 47 (15%) were summarily dismissed by the
court prior to any briefing or argument, 152 (47%) were voluntarily dismissed by the
parties, and 29 (9%) were either pending or their outcomes could not be determined due
to missing court records. See Coglianese, supra note 193, at 136.
248. See Coglianese, supra note 21, at 754.
249. Although only two challenges to EPA's negotiated rules have been resolved
through a decision by a judicial panel, between these cases there is no evidence that
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For years, proponents of negotiated rulemaking have touted it
as the solution to a perceived problem of excessive litigation
challenging federal regulations. Yet the prevailing perception of
this problem has been overdrawn. The actual level of litigation
over EPA rules is dramatically lower than has been widely be-
lieved, and litigation itself often provides a forum for continued
negotiation in the rulemaking process. Just as the extent of the
supposed problem of litigation has been overstated, so too has the
effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking as a means of reducing liti-
gation over federal regulations. The experience so far has been
that legal challenges persist, and at a noticeably higher rate at the
EPA, even after the agency has employed the negotiated
rulemaking procedure.' As a means of reducing litigation, ne-
gotiated rulemaking has yet to show any demonstrable success.
III. ASSESSING CONSENSUS-BASED RULEMAKING
If negotiated rulemaking were living up to the theoretical
advantages others have attributed to it-that is, if it really saved
agencies substantial time and avoided litigation-overworked agen-
cy officials might well be expected to use it extensively. Yet even
though the number of negotiated rulemakings has increased some-
what in the past few years, the practice remains confined to the
tiniest fraction of all federal regulations. 1 In light of the out-
comes negotiated rulemaking has achieved in terms of its two
main goals, such infrequent reliance on negotiated rulemaking
would seem to make sense. Negotiated rulemaking saves no appre-
ciable amount of time nor reduces the rate of litigation. In fact, at
negotiated rulemaking made the EPA rule more likely to be upheld. One decision re-
manded the rule to the EPA, giving petitioners some relief. See Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The other upheld the EPA rule
entirely. See Safe Bldgs. Alliance v. EPA, 846 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This 50 percent
"approval" rate for adjudicated challenges to negotiated rules mirrors the results of adju-
dicated challenges more generally. Of the 93 adjudicated EPA cases filed in the D.C.
Circuit from 1979 to 1990, 51 percent affirmed the rule entirely, while 49 percent granted
the petitioners some relief on at least one issue (as in the underground injection case).
See Coglianese, supra note 193, at 167; see also Wald, supra note 190, at 636-39 (report-
ing that the agency rule is upheld entirely in over 50 percent of the rulemaking reviews
decided by the D.C. Circuit).
250. Even if the three pending EPA reg negs managed to escape judicial challenges,
the litigation rate for negotiated rulemakings at the agency would still not be any lower
than that for significant EPA rules overall.
251. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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the EPA, negotiated rulemaking most likely demands a greater
total amount of time and has resulted in a higher rate of legal
filings than would otherwise be expected.
Given the extensive support negotiated rulemaking has gar-
nered in the Congress, White House, and legal community, these
findings will undoubtedly seem surprising. Although the results
reported here do challenge conventional wisdom, they are not
derived from any unconventional research methods. In assessing
the impact of negotiated rulemaking, I have simply sought to
assess the claims that negotiated rules will reduce time and litiga-
tion when compared with rules developed through informal
rulemaking. Like those who have claimed to demonstrate the
success of negotiated rulemaking, I have compared its outcomes
with those of conventional rulemaking.' 2 The main difference
between my research and past research is that past research has
generally been based on partial data and unsubstantiated beliefs
about prevailing litigation rates. The surprising results reported
here have resulted from a much more comprehensive effort to
document the outcomes of both negotiated rulemakings and infor-
mal rulemakings.
The implications my findings hold for the future use of nego-
tiated rulemaking may seem obvious. Before addressing them,
however, I want to address criticisms which might be made of this
comparative analysis. In the following section, I discuss the poten-
tial limitations inherent in any analysis of the impact of a policy
or procedural intervention. I show why in this case we can be
reasonably assured that any such limitations tend to exaggerate
negotiated rulemaking's success in reducing time and litiga-
tion-not its failure. The findings from my analysis are telling, I
252. See, e.g., IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 32 n.7 (purporting
to compare the litigation rate for negotiated rules with the litigation rate for all EPA
rules). In response to an earlier version of this Article, Edward Weber argued that a fo-
cus on the percentage of rules that groups challenge is too limited. My analysis would be
stronger, he suggested, if I "investigated the number of lawsuits filed for each rule, rather
than the frequency with which lawsuits are filed against individual rules." Weber, supra
note 150, at 325-26 n.219. Such an investigation does indeed strengthen my analysis.
Among those challenges to EPA rules filed in the D.C. Circuit from 1979 to 1990, the
average case consisted of 3.0 petitions for review. See Coglianese, supra note 193, at
132-33 (reporting 969 petitions consolidated into 322 cases). In contrast, the challenges to
EPA's negotiated rules consisted of an average of 3.7 petitions per case. Only one of the
six challenges to EPA's negotiated rules (the disinfectants byproducts rule) consisted of
fewer than 3 petitions. See supra notes 153-66, 213-46 and accompanying text.
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subsequently suggest, in what they reveal about regulatory
policymaking as well as about the wisdom of investing further
resources in the quest for consensus. I explain why negotiated
rulemaking has so far failed to meet proponents' expectations and
draw out the implications this study holds for future reliance on
formal procedures that depend on the achievement and mainte-
nance of consensus in the regulatory process.
A. Assessing This Assessment of Negotiated Rulemaking
To determine whether negotiated rulemaking has had any
discernible effect in reducing either rulemaking time or litigation,
it has been necessary to compare the results of the negotiated
rulemaking process with the likely results if a conventional
rulemaking process had been used instead. Of course, we can
never know with absolute certainty how long the rules selected for
negotiated rulemaking would have taken in the absence of negoti-
ated rulemaking, or whether they would have been litigated. We
can only infer what the outcome would have been in the absence
of negotiated rulemaking. 3
The best way to infer what would have happened in the ab-
sence of negotiated rulemaking is to compare rules selected for
negotiated rulemaking with those that were not. Ideally, the com-
parison group would be comprised of rules that had, on average,
the same probability of being challenged in court or the same
average time demands. If a sufficiently large number of rules were
randomly assigned to negotiated rulemaking and to informal
rulemaking, we could ensure that extraneous variables associated
with timeliness and litigation would be randomly distributed, leav-
ing the presence or absence of negotiated rulemaking as the only
remaining difference.' Any differences in outcomes could then
253. The need to draw inferences about this counterfactual outcome is inherent in any
effort to evaluate the impact of a policy or procedural intervention. See LAWRENCE B.
MOHR, IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION 3-4 (2d ed. 1995).
254. Even if we could randomly assign rules to negotiated rulemaking, doing so would
only allow us to analyze the impact of a different kind of negotiated rulemaking than
EPA currently employs-namely a kind where formal negotiation is required or imposed
on agency managers. Congress has mandated the use of negotiated rulemaking at the
Department of Education and other agencies. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
In contrast, EPA's voluntary selection process probably creates some bias in favor of the
success of negotiated rulemaking. Rules selected by the agency for formal negotiation
presumably have the kind of support that would tend to make negotiated rulemaking
1311
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be tested to determine whether they resulted from the use of
negotiated rulemaking. 5
Of course, agency rules were not randomly selected for nego-
tiated rulemaking. Instead, rules were purposely selected in most
cases by the very same agency managers who conducted or over-
saw the rulemaking proceedings. 6 As with any ex post evalu-
ation of a policy intervention, an analysis of the impact of negoti-
ated rulemaking must unavoidably face the possibility of selection
bias. 7 In other words, the nonrandom assignment of rules to
negotiated rulemaking introduces the possibility that the rules cho-
sen for negotiated rulemaking were ones that already had either a
greater or lesser need for time, or a greater or lesser propensity to
be litigated, at least when compared with the average rule imple-
mented through informal rulemaking.18
more, not less, successful. This source of bias could be minimized if agencies assigned
rules randomiy to negotiated rulemaking from among a pool of rules nominated by agen-
cy staff for the procedure (but no agency has done this). For a discussion of the poten-
tial threats to validity associated with voluntary selection, see MOHR, supra note 253, at
232-54.
255. With a sample of negotiated rules considerably larger than the 12 EPA rules
completed to date, it would be possible to use multivariate statistical techniques to con-
trol for other factors that might affect timeliness or litigation.
256. Moreover, not only do the agencies self-select the rules for negotiation, they also
control whether to continue a negotiation process once started. As Appendix A shows, a
number of agencies have withdrawn either rulemakings or negotiated proceedings even
after publishing a notice of intent to use negotiated rulemaking. Searching the Federal
Register, I found two rules that EPA has promulgated for which it either abandoned or
rejected negotiated rulemaking earlier in the rulemaking process. See Fuel and Fuel Addi-
tives Registration Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,042, 33,043 (1994) (rejecting negotiated
rulemaking at the outset due to "insufficient support ... among a number of key par-
ties"); Nitrogen Oxide Emission Reduction Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,538 (1994) (aban-
doning the negotiated rulemaking process and promulgating a final rule pursuant to tradi-
tional notice-and-comment procedures). Both of these rules later resulted in the filing of
petitions for judicial review. See Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 67 F.3d 941, 946 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (challenging the fuel and fuel additives rule); Alabama Power Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d
450, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (challenging the nitrogen oxides rule). The outcomes in these
rulemakings suggest that agencies avoid selecting rules for formal negotiation when they
are more likely to be challenged, an issue I discuss explicitly later in this Article. See
infra notes 253-93 and accompanying text.
257. In this case, selection bias would mean that the sample of negotiated rules was,
in some relevant sense, not representative of the sample of conventional rules against
which it is compared. See, e.g., KING ET AL, supra note 120, at 128-38 (discussing selec-
tion bias); Mosm, supra note 253, at 163-84 (discussing various types of potential biases
in impact analysis).
258. Even if the agency were selecting rules at random (something which would go a
long way toward addressing the possibility of selection bias), the fact that such a small
number of formally negotiated rules have been promulgated could mean that the average
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The ever-present possibility of selection bias in ex post evalua-
tions need not paralyze us from drawing reasonable inferences
from the available evidence. It is necessary to be mindful of the
possibility of selection bias, but it is equally important to consider
whether the possibility of such bias affects our ability to draw
inferences from the accumulated data. In the case of negotiated
rulemaking, there is good reason to believe that any overall selec-
tion bias tends in the direction of shorter rulemaking time and less
litigation, not the other way around.
To assess the direction of any selection bias, it is helpful to
consider other independent variables which are likely to be corre-
lated with rulemaking time and subsequent litigation. One such
variable related to both rulemaking time and litigation is the over-
all significance of a rule as classified by the agency.29 With re-
spect to rulemaking time, Kerwin and Furlong have found that
rulemaking takes more time for major and significant rules than
for minor rules.2 ° With respect to litigation, it is generally
thought that disputes having a greater impact on parties' interests
outcomes associated with these rules were affected by other variables or by chance rather
than by the presence or absence of negotiated rulemaking. While small sample sizes
make it difficult to draw inferences with confidence using standard statistical measures, in
this case the observed effects (namely, noticeably more litigation rather than less) are so
contrary to expectations that it is reasonable to conclude that negotiated rulemaking has
not achieved its goals. The limitations of a small sample size would present more of a
problem if negotiated rulemaking did appear to save time or reduce litigation. For exam-
ple, when the National Performance Review (NPR) claimed a lower litigation rate for ten
of EPA's negotiated rules, see supra note 135, the sample size made it extremely difficult
to reject the conventional null hypothesis of no impact and conclude that negotiated
rulemaking caused the asserted reduction in litigation. As it turns out, the NPR failed to
consider that more rules had been challenged. The full record makes it even more rea-
sonable to infer that negotiated rulemaking has not had its intended impact.
259. The terminology used in such classifications has changed somewhat from the Rea-
gan-Bush administrations to the Clinton administration. I treat as "significant" those rules
that are published in the semi-annual regulatory agenda. Se4 ag., EPA Semiannual Uni-
fied Regulatory Agenda, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,024, 52,024 (1992) (excluding "minor, routine,
or repetitive actions" from list of regulations and regulatory reviews). I consider as "ma-
jor" those significant rules which would be considered as major under the standards of
Executive Order 12,291, most notably those rules having an annual economic impact of
more than $100 million. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (re-
voked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994)). Under the Clinton administration, rules that would have previously been labeled
"major" are now labeled as "significant." See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). For ease of reference, I keep with the ter-
minology of Executive Order 12,291 even for rules issued after 1992.
260. See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 113, at 124.
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are more likely to end up in court.26' Empirical research tends
to confirm this tendency for disputes over agency regulations. 62
As noted in Part H of this Article, the litigation rate for signifi-
cant EPA rules is higher than that for EPA rules generally.2"
More importantly, the litigation rate for major rules is higher still.
As shown in Table 4, the litigation rate for significant RCRA and
Clean Air Act rules completed during 1980-1991 was 35 percent;
the rate for major RCRA and Clean Air Act rules during a simi-
lar period, 1983-1991, was 57 percent.2 4
Since rulemaking time and the prospects for litigation increase
with the overall significance of EPA rules, it is helpful to deter-
mine whether the findings reported in Part II derive from a bias
in the level of significance of the rules selected for negotiated
rulemaking. If rules selected for formal negotiation dis-
proportionately tended to be the major rules issued by an agency,
it would be more appropriate to compare these rules with the
outcomes for major rules established without negotiated rule-
making.' Upon examination, though, negotiated rules do not
appear to have taken up a disproportionate share of major rules.
Out of the thirty-five negotiated rules that federal agencies have
promulgated over the past decade and a half, only five have had
estimated annual costs in excess of $100 million.26 In contrast,
from 1983 to 1990 federal agencies promulgated an average of 39
major rules each year.267
261. See, eg., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LrERATURE 1067 (1989) (discussing the
incentives to litigate); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (reviewing literature on disputing behavior).
262. See Coglianese, supra note 21, at 742-43 n.3.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
264. See Coglianese, supra note 193, at 95-96. This subset of major rules under these
two statutes contained about one-third of all major EPA rules completed during the
period. See id. at 96 n.42.
265. Even if one made this kind of a comparison for litigation, the 50% litigation rate
for EPA's 12 negotiated rules would still not be appreciably lower than the litigation rate
for all the major rules under RCRA and the Clean Air Act. See supra note 264 and
accompanying text.
266. See Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools, supra note 213, at 41,843; Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline Standards, supra note 152, at 7810; Transportation for
Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 45,584, 45,620 (1991) (codified at scattered
sections of 49 C.F.R.); HON Rule, supra note 226, at 19,411; Vessel Response Plans, 61
Fed. Reg. 1052, 1079 (1996) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 155).
267. See 0MB, REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 97, at 706 (Exhibit 4).
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With respect to the EPA, four of its twelve completed negoti-
ated rulemakings were classified as major, even though one of
these imposed no net costs on the economy.211 The proportion
of EPA negotiated rulemakings considered major (33%) is only
modestly higher than the proportion considered major among the
significant rules analyzed by Kerwin and Furlong in their study of
EPA rulemaking (29%).269 Moreover, it should be evident that
the EPA has not relied on negotiated rulemaking to develop most
of its major rules. The four major rules subject to negotiated
rulemaking amounted to only a small fraction of all the major
rules issued by the EPA during the same time period.27 These
data confirm that it is reasonable to compare, as I have done in
this analysis, the performance of negotiated rules with the per-
formance of significant EPA rules promulgated through conven-
tional notice-and-comment procedures.27'
268. See Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools, supra note 213, at 41,843-45; Re-
formulated and Conventional Gasoline Standards, supra note 152, at 7810; HON Rule,
supra note 226, at 19,402. The woodstoves rule was also classified as "major" under
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)), but only because the rule had
the potential to increase significantly prices for certain stoves or affect the competitive
position of certain firms within the woodstoves market. See New Source Performance
Standards for Residential Wood Combustion Units, 53 Fed. Reg. 5860, 5862 (1988) (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The EPA determined that any increased costs associated with
more efficient woodstoves would "be more than offset by cost savings from the need for
less firewood and for fewer chimney cleanings." Id.
269. Fifteen of the fifty-one major and significant rules studied by Kerwin and Fur-
long were major, or 29%. Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 113, at 123.
270. EPA promulgated an average of six major rules each year from 1985 to 1990.
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1986-MAR. 31, 1987, at 555 (Exhibit 2); OFFICE OF MAN-
AGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, APR. 1, 1987-MAR. 31, 1988, at 624 (Exhibit 2); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1,
1988-MAR. 31, 1989, at 548 (Exhibit 2); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGU-
LATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1990-MAR. 31, 1991,
at 627-28 (Exhibits 2 & 2A); OMB, 1992 REGULATORY PROGRAM, supra note 97, at 704
(Exhibit 2). Under the Clinton administration, the Office of Management and Budget
ceased publication of the annual Regulatory Program. If we assume that the EPA contin-
ued to promulgate an average of six major rules each year, then the four major negotiat-
ed rules amount to only about 5% of all EPA's major rules.
271. The comparison with the entire population of significant rules is more reliable
than selecting only a nonrandom sample of these rules. If I selected a sample of informal
rules, as Kerwin and Langbein have done in the second phase of their study, I would
introduce the possibility of bias in the control group as well as the treatment group. For
a brief description of the Kerwin and Langbein study, see supra notes 91-92 and accom-
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Although the EPA has not negotiated a disproportionate
number of major rules, the outcomes of the agency's negotiated
rules could still be checked against the outcomes of its major
rules. Even then, negotiated rulemaking does not appear to have
had any notable effect of decreasing time or litigation. The aver-
age time it took the EPA to complete its dozen negotiated rules
(1013 days)272 exceeded the average time for major rules issued
by three of the four program offices studied by Kerwin and Fur-
long.273 Moreover, the average time for the three major negotiat-
ed rules issued under the Clean Air Act (1225 days) substantially
exceeded the average time for major air rules reported by Kerwin
and Furlong.274
A similar pattern holds for litigation rates. Although petition-
ers challenged somewhat more than half of all major rules under
RCRA and the Clean Air Act (57%), they have challenged three
out of the four major negotiated rules (75%). When major rules
are taken out of the sample of significant rules, the litigation rate
for the remaining conventional rules is 30 percent while the litiga-
tion rate for the remaining negotiated rules is still higher at 37.5
panying text.
272. For an explanation of how I calculated this average, see supra text accompanying
notes 118-19.
273. See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 113, at 136 app. B.
274. Kerwin and Furlong report a start-to-finish average of 648 days for the four ma-
jor air rules in their sample. See id One of these major rules was the woodstoves rule
for which EPA used negotiated rulemaking. The average time for the three air reg negs
(woodstoves, equipment leaks, and reformulated gasoline) came out to 1225 days-over a
year and a half longer. In responding to an earlier version of this Article, Philip Harter
argued that the reformulated gasoline rule took an "astonishingly short" amount of time
but that the equipment leaks rule took much longer because it was merged into a larger
conventional rulemaking. See Harter, supra note 119, app. B, at 1425. Yet even if we as-
sume that the equipment leaks rule was finalized on the day when the last notice of an
open meeting of the committee was published in the Federal Register, July 5, 1990, there
is still no measurable time savings for these major rules from negotiated rulemaking. See
Open Meeting of the Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee; Fugitive Emissions
From Equipment Leaks Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,680 (1990). Even using this patently unre-
alistic assumption (which creates a heavy bias in favor of finding a time savings) the
time for major negotiated air rules is still 763 days, or about 3.5 months longer than the
average time it took to promulgate the four major air rules included in the Kerwin and
Furlong study. See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 113, at 136 app. B. Those significant,
but non-major, negotiated rules do fare better compared with the significant conventional
rules for three out of the five categories reported by Kerwin and Furlong, see id., but it
should be kept in mind that my time data for negotiated rules understate the full
rulemaking time measured by Kerwin and Furlong. See supra text accompanying note
119.
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percent. Although the number of rules in these subsets is small,
these data support the conclusion that negotiated rulemaking has
not achieved its goal of reducing litigation.
This analysis strongly suggests that selection bias has not set
negotiated rules up to fail in terms of time and litigation. If any
selection bias does exist in the types of rules selected for negotiat-
ed rulemaking, it has undoubtedly tended in the opposite direc-
tion-in favor of time savings and litigation avoidance. Although
agencies have little reason to use negotiated rulemaking for their
most routine rules, in choosing among their significant regulatory
actions it appears that agencies have chosen those rules that would
have had less of a tendency for time delays or litigation.
There is good reason to believe they have made these choices
purposefully. From the seminal work of Philip Harter to the pres-
ent, the prescriptive literature on negotiated rulemaking repeatedly
suggests that negotiated rulemaking only be used under limited
circumstances when its success can be most assured. 75 In his
original article on negotiated rulemaking, Harter highlighted what
he called the "conditions that improve the likelihood of success"
of negotiated rulemaking and urged agencies to select rules for
negotiation with these conditions in mind.76 The Negotiated Ru-
lemaking Act incorporated some of these conditions and now re-
quires agencies to determine if a rule meets the stated conditions
for success before convening a negotiated rulemaking.2 "
One such condition is the presence of only a limited number
of affected parties. Harter specifically stated that "negotiation
275. See, ag., Harter, supra note 12, at 42-52 (discussing "conditions that improve the
likelihood of successful negotiations"); Perritt, supra note 17, at 1642-46 (outlining criteria
for selecting appropriate rulemakings for negotiation); Susskind & McMahon, supra note
17, at 138-40, 151-57 (examining preconditions for successful negotiated rulemaking); 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 37-40 (listing factors that should be considered before
selecting appropriate rules for negotiation).
276. Harter, supra note 12, at 42-52.
277. See 5 U.S.C. § 563 (1994) (listing criteria for agencies to consider when deter-
mining if there is a need for negotiated rulemaking). As early as 1982, the Administra-
tive Conference recommended that agency conveners should "conduct a preliminary inqui-
ry to determine whether a regulatory negotiating group should be empaneled," expressly
considering factors related to its success and proceeding with the negotiation only if is
determined to be "appropriate." ACUS Recommendation No. 82-4, supra note 32, at
4, reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 11, 12. Agencies conducted pre-
negotiation screenings of rules even before the practice was essentially required by the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act. See 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 40, 45-47; Eisner,
supra note 17, at 374.
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would not work" when "an environmental regulation may apply
generally to all industry, and yet affect each industrial sector dif-
ferently enough so that even several individuals could not repre-
sent the interests of all of the sectors.""' z The Negotiated
Rulemaking Act specifically directs agencies to consider whether
the rule affects only "a limited number of identifiable inter-
ests,"279 and the EPA recommends formal negotiation only when
the parties are "reasonably few in number."'
Not surprisingly, the EPA rules that affect the broadest num-
ber of organizations have never been selected for negotiated
rulemaking. For example, the EPA did not use negotiated
rulemaking to develop its revisions to the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for particulates and ozone." 1 The agency also
avoided negotiated rulemaking for its major programmatic rules
under RCRA, including those regulating the land disposal of haz-
ardous wastes' and establishing criteria for toxicity characteris-
tics.' Each of these programmatic rules affected a wide range
of interests and seemed more likely from the outset to elicit peti-
tions for judicial review.' In contrast, EPA's negotiated rules
278. Harter, supra note 12, at 46.
279. 5 U.S.C. § 583 (a)(2) (1994); see also ACUS Recommendation No. 82-4, supra
note 32, at 4c, reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 11, 12 ("[T]here
should be a limited number of interests that will be significantly affected by the rule and
therefore represented in the negotiations.").
280. Regulatory Negotiation Project Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 7494, 7495 (1983).
281. See Ozone NAAQS Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 50); Particulate NAAQS Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 50).
282. See Land Disposal Restrictions for First Third Scheduled Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg.
31,138 (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 264-266, 268, & 271); Land Disposal Restrictions
for Second Third Scheduled Wastes, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,594 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 148, 264-266, 268, & 271); Land Disposal Restrictions for Third Third Scheduled
Wastes, 54 Fed. Reg. 48,372 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 148, 261, 264, 265, 268, &
271).
283. See Toxicity Characteristics Revisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,798 (1990) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 261, 264, 268, 271, & 302).
284. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (addressing
challenges to EPA's first third rule); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 89-1531 (D.C.
Cir. filed Sept. 5, 1989) (challenging the second third scheduled wastes rule); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (addressing challenges to
EPA's third third rule); Edison Electric Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ad-
dressing challenges to EPA's toxicity characteristics rule); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.
v. EPA, No. 97-1440 (D.C. Cir. filed July 18, 1997) (challenging the particulate NAAQS
revisions); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, No. 97-1441 (D.C. Cir. filed July 18,
1997) (challenging the ozone NAAQS revisions).
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have stood at least a notch below the agency's large programmatic
rules in terms of their scope and importance. Each of the negoti-
ated rules has affected only a limited number of parties, at times
just a single industry, precisely as the agency's own guidelines sug-
gest.' Instead of selecting the most challenging rules, the agen-
cy has used negotiated rulemaking for what an earlier EPA report
called "'second-tier' rules," or those rules "affecting program im-
plementation-rather than rules establishing program struc-
ture."286
To the extent that the EPA has accepted other criteria long
prescribed for selecting rules for formal negotiation, it has system-
atically chosen to negotiate rules that are less likely to take a long
time and that are less likely to result in litigation. These additional
criteria, some of which are codified in the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act, include:
* "[a] legislative or judicially imposed deadline or some
other mechanism forcing publication of a rule in the near
term; ,,27
285. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act recommends limiting a rulemaking committee to
25 members. See 5 U.S.C. § 565 (1994). Even a committee of this size could not purport
to represent all the interests affected by the varied sectors affected by EPA's program-
matic rules, such as those mentioned at supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
EPA's negotiated rules have instead targeted specific industries, such as woodstove manu-
facturers, the chemical industry, petroleum refiners, and automobile manufacturers. See
infra Appendices A, B, and C. They have also focused on single substances in limited
realms, such as asbestos in public schools or disinfectant byproducts in drinking water.
See supra notes 213, 236 and accompanying text. These rules are by no means routine,
but neither are they the agency's most foundational rules that have implications for mul-
tiple industrial sectors across the country.
286. U.S. ENvrL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 130, at 12, reprinted in 1995
SOURc EBOOK, supra note 30, at 34; see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as
a Policy Process, 48 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 764, 770 (1988) ("[T]he negotiation process is
more reliable and legitimate when it is applied to the resolution of 'how to' rather than
'what' decisions.").
287. Regulatory Negotiation Project Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 7494, 7495 (1983) (EPA); see
also ACUS Recommendation No. 82-4, supra note 32, at I 4(a), reprinted in 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 12 (recommending the establishment of a "relatively
fixed time frame" within which decisions on a rule should be made); Harter, supra note
12, at 47 (suggesting that negotiations work best in a climate of urgency, generated by
the inevitability or imminence of a decision); Perritt, supra note 17, at 1644 (arguing that
effective negotiation requires deadline pressure to force people to make concessions);
Susskind & McMahon, supra note 17, at 140 (arguing that parties may purposefully delay
the settlement of a negotiation without the pressure of a deadline).
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* "[a] reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a
consensus on the proposed rule within a fixed period of
time; ' '2
0 a determination that "the negotiated rulemaking will not
unreasonably delay the notice of proposed rulemaking and the
issuance of the final rule;"'
* a finding that "some or all of the parties have common
positions on one or more of the issues to be resolved that
might serve as a basis for additional agreements;" 290
* a willingness by "[t]he participants in the negotiations...
to negotiate in good faith;"' '
* a set of regulatory issues for which "no party will have to
compromise a fundamental value;"2' and
0 a determination that "the parties are likely to participate
in negotiations as an alternative to litigation."2"
Rules satisfying these additional criteria would also seem to fall
well within a second-tier of an agency's otherwise significant rules.
Although selection bias is a potential concern in any impact
analysis, the data reveal no discernible bias of negotiated rules
toward the most significant rules. Moreover, the selection criteria
established by EPA show that any remaining bias tends to make it
more likely that negotiated rulemaking will succeed. The small
fraction of significant and major rules that agencies choose to
negotiate are not likely to be the most irresolvable rules. When
only about 35 percent of the EPA's most significant rules ordinari-
288. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(4) (1994).
289. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(5) (1994).
290. Regulatory Negotiation Project Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. at 7495; see also Chris Kirtz,
Regulatory Negotiation: The New Way to Develop Negotiations?, 1 J. ENVTL. PERMrrrNG
269, 272 (1992) (stating that parties should have common goals and positions).
291. ACUS Recommendation No. 82-4, supra note 32, at I 4(0, reprinted in 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 12.
292. 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 11; see also ACUS Recommendation No.
82-4, supra note 32, at 4b, reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 29, at 11 (stat-
ing that negotiations should not require participants "to compromise their fundamental
tenets"); Harter, supra note 12, at 49 ("Competing interests cannot negotiate an
agreement if the disputed issue concerns fundamental values."); Perritt, supra note 17, at
1645 (stating that negotiated rulemakings should not raise fundamental value conflicts);
Susskind & McMahon, supra note 17, at 152 ("[P]arties are unlikely to make the neces-
sary concessions to reach consensus if the only way to reach agreement is to compromise
fundamental values or beliefs.").
293. Regulatory Negotiation Project Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. at 7495.
1320 [Vol. 46:1255
ASSESSING CONSENSUS
ly end up in court, it is reasonable to conclude that those rules
which meet the various conditions for a successful reg neg would
probably be more likely at the outset to fall within the 65 percent
of rules that do not elicit any litigation. We can also expect that
such rules would have a tendency to take less time than other
significant rules. That negotiated rulemaking should nevertheless
fail to reduce time or litigation is all the more striking given the
criteria agencies have articulated for selecting rules for negotiation.
B. Reevaluating Negotiated Rulemaking
Why has negotiated rulemaking failed to achieve its principal
objectives? At least three reasons can explain why the perfor-
mance of negotiated rulemaking has failed to surpass the perfor-
mance of conventional rulemaking. First, negotiated rulemaking
actually creates new sources of potential conflict in the regulatory
process, even though it is ostensibly designed to reduce conflict.
Second, the structure of the regulatory process provides numerous
opportunities to disrupt the consensus on which negotiated
rulemaking depends. Third, conventional rulemaking has been
more effective than previously thought, particularly in avoiding liti-
gation. In this section, I explore these reasons and conclude that
negotiated rulemaking, distinguished by its search for consensus,
has been an oversold solution to an overstated problem.
At the outset, proponents of negotiated rulemaking might
seek to explain negotiated rulemaking's performance differently by
trying to shift some of the "blame." They might argue, for exam-
ple, that in some cases negotiated rulemaking did not cause litiga-
tion, but that litigation came about because of unclear or ineffec-
tual statutes.294 They might also argue that delays have not been
caused by the negotiations themselves-which have sometimes
294. Some have suggested that the subsequent controversy over the reformulated gaso-
line rule stemmed not from the negotiated rulemaking process but from problems in the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. See Harter, supra note 119, app. B, at 1425; Weber,
supra note 150, at 355-56 n.371. Of course, problems do arise in statutes, thereby giving
parties incentives to seek judicial interpretations. Yet even though these problems can
occur with negotiated rules, they most certainly also arise with rules adopted through
conventional rulemaking. Thus, one cannot seek to exclude such "statutory challenges"
from the set of negotiated rules that groups have challenged without also excluding those
same kinds of challenges from the set of litigated rules adopted using conventional
rulemaking.
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been concluded over several months' time-but from delays within
the agency after the negotiations have ended.295 Whatever the
merits of these claims, such attempts to deflect the responsibility
for litigation or time delays away from the negotiated rulemaking
process ultimately miss the point. Although there is good reason
to think that negotiated rulemaking does create additional conflicts
in the administrative process, the underlying issue to which my
analysis speaks is not whether negotiated rulemaking causes law-
suits or time delays. Rather, the issue is whether it prevents
them. 96 Despite the many hopes for negotiated rulemaking, it
has shown itself incapable of preventing the conflict that leads to
regulatory delays and petitions for review.
1. Sources of Conflict Introduced by Negotiated Rulemaking.
In seeking consensus over the substance of regulations, negotiated
rulemaking has long been considered a means of reducing conflict
in the regulatory process. Yet formal negotiation can actually
foster conflict. It adds three new sources of conflict stemming
from decisions about membership on negotiated rulemaking com-
mittees; the consistency of final rules with negotiated agreements;
and the potential for an overall heightened sensitivity to adverse
aspects of rules.
The first of these new sources of conflict stems from agency
decisions about membership on negotiated rulemaking committees.
As discussed above, the criteria for negotiated rulemaking have
295. In a similar vein, proponents of negotiated rulemaking might argue that negotiat-
ed rulemaking has failed not because of anything intrinsic to it as an administrative pro-
cedure, but rather because of the manner in which agencies have implemented the proce-
dure. Although this argument may have some surface appeal, it demands a clear showing
of what exactly administrators could have done differently in these cases, given the many
pressures on them from inside and outside government. If negotiated rulemaking's success
ultimately hinges on the existence of some Herculean administrator, reg neg cannot be
considered a realistic means of hastening rulemaking or preventing litigation.
296. If all of negotiated rulemaking's failings can be attributed to other aspects of the
regulatory process, that would by no means constitute an endorsement of negotiated
rulemaking as a solution to the supposed problems of the regulatory process. On the
contrary, that would simply amount to an admission that negotiated rulemaking has not
addressed those aspects of the regulatory process that lead, in some cases, to time delays
and litigation. Of course, it may well be the case that nothing else could have prevented
delays or litigation. As Susan Rose-Ackerman has suggested, in some instances of statuto-
ry ambiguity, no form of administrative process will deter parties from seeking a judicial
interpretation of a statute. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19, at 1220. Even though us-
ing negotiated rulemaking in such instances might not create the incentives to seek judi-
cial review, neither would it eliminate them.
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led agencies to prefer rules that affect a limited range of par-
ties.' 9 Even with this tendency, agencies have sometimes still
not been able to include all the organizations who feel they will
be affected by a rule. Although the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
insulates the agency from judicial review of its decisions about
membership on negotiated rulemaking committees,298 the exclu-
sion of groups from membership on the committees adds a source
of discontentment not otherwise present in notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The decision to use a select committee whose repre-
sentatives will develop a draft rule apparently attracts even closer
scrutiny by organizations not represented at the negotiating table.
Not surprisingly, the EPA has been criticized by parties who
were not invited to participate on the agency's negotiation com-
mittees. In the asbestos rule, for example, the negotiations were
temporarily disrupted while additional parties sought to participate
in the negotiations.29 9 In the disinfectant byproducts negotiation,
the chlorine industry complained that it had been "unfairly exclud-
ed" from full participation in the negotiated rulemaking.'" As I
have already shown, the reformulated gasoline rule elicited a legal
challenge from a tank truck trade association which was not repre-
sented on the negotiated rulemaking committee,"' as well as
trade challenges from two countries not included on the commit-
tee." The negotiations over the Grand Canyon visibility rule
and the wood furniture coatings rule also prompted litigation by
groups not participating on the negotiation committee.3 3
One organization alone is capable of upsetting a consensus
built on unanimity or filing a petition for judicial review. Conse-
quently, even a small number of excluded parties can pose a
threat to the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking. In Kerwin
and Langbein's study, twelve percent of the respondents reported
that they had to "press" the EPA to let them participate.3°
297. See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
298. See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994).
299. See Participants and Facilitators Discuss Negotiation of EPA's Proposed Rule on
Asbestos in Schools, supra note 216, at 154.
300. Environmental, Industry Groups Clash on Issues in SDWA Reauthorization Bill,
27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 266, 267 (May 17, 1996).
301. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 149, 233 and accompanying text.
304. See KERWIN & LANGBEIN, supra note 89, at 11.
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Thirty-five percent of those same respondents reported that at
least one affected interest was not represented at the negotiating
table, a noteworthy finding considering that it is based on respons-
es by those who were represented." s The likelihood that an
agency excludes even one organization from a negotiated
rulemaking committee poses an inherent threat to the effectiveness
of a procedure that depends on consensus to foreclose litigation.
In addition to conflict over committee membership, negotiated
rulemaking adds conflict over the meaning of any consensus and
the extent to which an agency's decision reflects that meaning.
Sometimes conflicts arise simply between participants over what
each thinks a negotiated agreement means. In the disinfectant
byproducts rule, for example, a representative from the Natural
Resources Defense Council reportedly criticized the American
Water Works Association for subsequently urging EPA to set
action levels rather than the more stringent maximum contaminant
levels NRDC supported in the negotiation."° AWWA thought
its position was consistent with the negotiations because it only
agreed to support maximum contaminant levels once the agency
could provide adequate microbial data."
Conflicts can also arise over what was not agreed to in the
negotiated agreement-what might be termed expressio unius dis-
putes. These disputes center on whether a negotiated agreement's
silence on an issue reflects an agreement that the agency take no
action."' In the reformulated gasoline case, the American Petro-
leum Institute charged that EPA's decision to impose second
phase nitrogen oxide standards contravened the agreement because
the agreement did not address second phase standards." 9 The
EPA rejected API's administrative petition, concluding that the
agreement's silence allowed the agency to proceed without retreat-
ing from the consensus."' 0
305. See id.
306. See Water Organization Recommends That EPA Proceed With Rules on
Microbials, Byproducts, supra note 245, at 1576.
307. See id.
308. Sometimes the silence may simply reflect an oversight, as the issue of compressor
issue standards apparently did in the equipment leaks negotiation. See supra note 246 and
text accompanying notes 226-30.
309. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
1324 [Vol. 46:1255
ASSESSING CONSENSUS
More notably, conflicts arise over the extent to which the
agency has adhered to the stated terms of the negotiated
agreement. For example, in the reformulated gasoline case, the
petroleum industry felt betrayed by the EPA's subsequent decision
to issue a separate rule favorable to the ethanol industry.311 Sim-
ilarly, in the Department of Education's student loan rulemaking,
loan servicers charged that the Department breached commitments
it made during the negotiated rulemaking.312 More recently, the
petroleum industry criticized the Department of Interior's Minerals
Management Service when it decided to reopen the comment
period over its natural gas royalties rulemaking.3 3 Without an
attempt at negotiated rulemaking, these conflicts over the commit-
ment of the agency to a negotiated agreement could not arise.
The third way negotiated rulemaking can add conflict is by
heightening the sensitivity of the parties to adverse portions of a
rule. Negotiated agreements raise expectations. When the agency
does not follow the negotiated agreement, the existence of the
agreement itself stirs up dissatisfaction. For example, consider a
conventional rulemaking in which an agency fails to follow the
input provided by an affected organization. In that case, the orga-
nization has mainly to complain about how adversely the rule
affects its interests and how its comments were not accepted. If
the agency were to enact the very same rule in contravention of a
negotiated agreement, the organization would suffer both the
adverse effects of the rule as well as the impression that it had
been "sandbagged.,314 Such a reaction in this latter case would
seem even more likely if the organization had compromised on
other portions of the rule in order to secure gains on the portion
subsequently undercut by the agency. Even if the underlying rule
were the same in both cases, we would expect the organization to
perceive its interests to be more severely aggrieved in the latter
case.31 Similarly, we might expect representatives of organiza-
311. See Renewable Fuels to Make. Up 30 Percent of Oxygenates in Reformulated Gas
Program, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 462 (July 8, 1994).
312. See USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996).
313. See Patrick Crow, Reg-Neg Regrets, OIL & GAS J., May 27, 1996, at 24.
314. Id. at 26 (reporting an oil industry representative's response to the Mineral Man-
agement Service's action to reopen the comment period on negotiated rule).
315. Prospect theory suggests that negotiators would ascribe additional negative value
to the "loss" of a more preferable outcome they thought they had already secured. See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
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tions excluded from a negotiation committee to react more acutely
to an adverse portion of a rule if they knew the rule was devel-
oped in explicit consultation with other organizations having po-
tentially divergent interests.
In a more general sense, we can expect negotiated rulemaking
to heighten conflict simply because of the intensity with which
groups scrutinize the rules that are the subject of negotiations.
One side benefit often attributed to negotiated rulemaking is that
it facilitates learning, both by agency staff and interest group rep-
resentatives. 16 The additional time and resources groups devote
to discussing rules developed through negotiation provides greater
awareness of the issues underlying the rule.317 When groups in-
vest these additional resources in negotiation, their representatives
presumably also learn more about how aspects of the rule may ad-
versely affect their group interests. Groups may also find that the
more time they invest in a rulemaking proceeding, the less willing
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). In addition, procedural justice theory would suggest
that negotiators would view the fairness of the negotiating procedure at least as impor-
tantly as the outcome. See E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
316. See, eg., Fiornio, supra note 286, at 768 ("[Negotiated rulemaking is] described
as educational, as offering a forum for presenting arguments and evidence, as a way of
understanding another side's point of view, and as a chance to generate new ideas and
options.")
317. Participation in negotiated rulemaking demands much from all participants, in-
cluding agencies, industry groups, and citizen groups. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, COSTS OF REGULATORY NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE (1987), reprinted in 1995
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 273-74 (indicating that the EPA's first seven negotiated
rulemakings imposed over $650,000 in additional costs on the agency); KERWIN &
LANGBEIN, supra note 89, at 36 (showing that industry groups spent an average of nearly
$700,000 per rulemaking to collect information and participate in formal negotiations);
Regulatory Negotiation: Four Perspectives, DR FORUM (National Inst. Disp. Resol.), Jan.
1986, reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 858 (quoting statement by David
Doniger, attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, that "regulatory negotiation
takes about 10 times as much of our resources as commenting on a rule"); see also
Owen Olpin et al., Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution to Rulemaking, 1 ADMIN. LJ.
575, 579 (1987) (providing a statement by David Doniger that he "put in 30 full days on
the woodstove rule . . . and by contrast ... probably would have put in three days
writing comments on the draft rule for traditional rulemaking"). Preliminary results from
the second phase of the study by Cornelius Kerwin and Laura Langbein indicated that
participants in negotiated rulemakings spent an average of six times as much professional
staff time than did participants in the conventional rulemakings included in their study.
See Kerwin & Langbein, supra note 92, at 24-25. In addition, Kerwin and Langbein have
found that "negotiated rulemaking participants were three times as likely (30% vs. 9%)
to volunteer that the process required 'too much' time, effort, money, or other re-
source[s]." Id. at 29.
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they are to overlook imperfections in the rule. In these ways, the
quest for consensus unintentionally contributes new sources of
conflict to the regulatory process that can limit negotiated
rulemaking's ability to reduce rulemaking time and litigation.
2. The Fragility of Consensus. Even if a search for consensus
could avoid creating new kinds of conflicts, negotiated rulemaking
still would have a difficult time succeeding in many cases for
another reason altogether. Any procedure that depends for its
success on the maintenance of a consensus is, given the realities of
the federal regulatory process, fighting uphill.' 8 A consensus
forged at the earliest stages of the rulemaking process is
inherently fragile because the structure of the American
administrative state provides numerous opportunities for that
consensus to unravel.
Even if all the participants in the negotiated rulemaking reach
a consensus, the agency must still prepare a preamble to a pro-
posed rule and provide an opportunity for public comment on that
proposal.319 If the public comment period is to be meaningful,
the agency must consider changing the proposed rule in light of
any negative comments it receives on a proposal, even if such a
change entails a retreat from a consensus.32 In addition, during
the development of the proposed and final rule, the agency re-
ceives input from the Office of Management and Budget (and
sometimes other executive branch officials) which may lead the
agency to modify features of a rule. 2' Members of Congress
318. Cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19, at 1209 ("A regulatory negotiation is not
analogous to a therapy session or a friendly, disinterested discussion of policy options.").
319. The procedures authorized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 only sup-
plement the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 581 (1994). Some of the added detail the agency gives to the preamble or the rule
during the notice-and-comment period may depart from what the parties thought they
had agreed to in the negotiation.
320. See, eg., Crow, supra note 313, at 320 (describing how the comment period was
reopened in response to criticisms of the Mineral Management Service's negotiated pro-
posal).
321. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations, for example, took close interest in
the reformulated gasoline rule, prompting the agency to issue the companion renewable
oxygenates requirement which arguably breached the negotiated agreement. See Ethanol
Mandate Raises Question: Can Reg-Neg Process be Trusted?, AIR & WATER POLLUTION
REP. ENV'T WY-, July 4, 1994, at 219; see also EPA's Proposed Renewable Oxygenate
Standard. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 103d
Cong. 29 (1994) (statement of Mary Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radia-
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may step in and attempt to pressure the agency or change the un-
derlying statute in such a way as to disrupt the consensus.322 As
we have seen, other interest groups may also challenge the rule in
court, which can lead an agency to change the rule further.3"
Finally, even if a consensus reached during the early stages of
rulemaking could remain intact through all the subsequent stages,
the agency can decide at a later time to revise the rule.324
Theories predicting the success of negotiated rulemaking are
based on the assumption that everyone who could ever con-
ceivably take an interest in a rule will come to a complete and
stable agreement on every particular aspect of that rule. If that
could happen throughout government as well as throughout the
interest group community, a rule could theoretically sail undis-
turbed through the entire rulemaking process. Yet what is
theoretically possible is different than what is realistically probable.
The intervention by a few well-placed agency managers, or by
OMB, the White House, or Congress, can lead to modifications
that begin the unravelling of a consensus. It only takes one
interest group excluded from the negotiation, or one included but
defecting group, to begin unravelling the consensus from outside
government .32  Any heightened sensitivities created by the
process of reaching a consensus may serve to accelerate the
breakdown of consensus. In practice, the fact that agencies are
embedded within a dynamic political environment makes maintain-
ing consensus a bit like building a house of cards.32
tion, EPA) (stating that President Bush "directed" the EPA to propose a renewable oxy-
genates program). The involvement of the Bush administration also reportedly led the
EPA to abandon the negotiated rulemaking process for its nitrogen oxides rule. See
Marianne Lavelle, EPA Calls Off Sessions on Rules, NAT'L LJ., July 8, 1991, at 3, 28.
As a general rule, courts have recognized intra-executive branch input as a legitimate
part of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. See eg., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 404-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
322. For example, congressional debate over the reauthorization of the Safe Drinking
Water Act followed closely behind the conclusion of the disinfectant byproducts negotiat-
ed rulemaking, and at least one affected group succeeded in having legislation introduced
which would have undermined the negotiation process. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, supra note 13, at 187.
323. See supra notes 149, 161, 233 and accompanying text.
324. The Department of Education has made subsequent changes to rules that
emerged from negotiated rulemaking. See William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program,
60 Fed. Reg. 61,790 (1995) (making changes to origination criteria in direct loan regula-
tions); William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 61,820 (1995) (mak-
ing changes to direct loan program's income contingent repayment plan).
325. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 187-88.
326. Cf. KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
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Of course, negotiated rulemaking is not really even like a
house of cards, but rather like the addition of an extra room to a
house with an unsteady foundation. Negotiated rulemaking adds
an early attempt at consensus-building to a regulatory process de-
signed to make it difficult to sustain interest group bargains. The
existing regulatory structure in the United States, with its multiple
decisionmakers and avenues of input, surely contributes to
rulemaking time and increases the possibility of litigation, at least
when compared to imagined alternatives lacking these multiple
avenues. This regulatory structure also impedes efforts that depend
on consensus by providing multiple steps at which consensus might
break down. We could conceive of ways to fix the inherent fragili-
ty of consensus, and thereby provide conditions for which negoti-
ated rulemaking could succeed, but such efforts would lead to a
vastly different administrative process237
From this perspective, it is not surprising that negotiated
rulemaking has failed to achieve its principal objectives. Negotiat-
ed rulemaking does not change at all the features that make the
regulatory process lengthy at times and susceptible to the pursuit
of judicial redress. Moreover, these same features, namely the
multiple avenues of input, tend to work against the maintenance
of consensus, which is the touchstone of negotiated rulemaking. In
this sense, negotiated rulemaking raises unrealistic expectations
about what can be accomplished in a governmental process charac-
terized by "endless bargaining. 32
In pointing out that the process of rulemaking makes it diffi-
cult to sustain a consensus achieved at the early stages of
rulemaking, I do not mean to imply that the rulemaking process is
necessarily dysfunctional. On the contrary, it can be thought highly
desirable to have a process that makes it harder for interest group
deals to stick. As Peter Strauss has written, "[tihe embeddedness
1963) (arguing that even simple majoritarian decisionmaking can be unstable).
327. See Funk, supra note 21, at 89-97. The agreements of negotiated rulemaking
committees could be more easily sustained if these committees, and only these commit-
tees, possessed unreviewable lawmaking authority. Yet if such a dramatic change were to
be implemented, and no proponent of negotiated rulemaking has suggested that it ought
to be, we might just as easily (if not more easily) reduce rulemaking time and litigation
by vesting unreviewable lawmaking authority in the agency itself and eliminating the
opportunity for public comment and judicial review. I am not proposing that we make
these changes, but merely pointing out the limits in the U.S. administrative state of any
consensus-based solution to the problems of regulatory delays and litigation.
328. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 150 (1956).
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of the EPA, its focus and its relations with multiple, organization-
ally superior overseers, gives us practical assurance that it will not
run out of control. 329 This same "embeddedness" that helps
keep EPA and other regulatory agencies under control also makes
it more difficult for these agencies to sustain agreements reached
through negotiated rulemaking.
3. The Success of Conventional Rulemaking. Although the
embeddedness of rulemaking makes it difficult to sustain a formal
negotiated agreement, it does not appear to keep agencies from
achieving closure on most of their other regulatory decisions.
Those features of the regulatory process that make it difficult to
sustain an explicit, pre-proposal consensus do not make conflict
and litigation inevitable in the usual course of rulemaking. As my
findings show, conventional rulemaking works far better in
avoiding litigated conflict than has been widely believed. The final
reason why negotiated rulemaking has failed to achieve its goals
therefore hinges on the comparative success of conventional
rulemaking.
Agencies and interest groups seem quite capable of working
with each other in the context of conventional rulemaking.330 If
discussions about agency capture, revolving doors, and policy net-
works over the years have had any truth to them at all, regulators
have always kept in touch with affected organizations and their
representatives.33' Cornelius Kerwin reports that nearly three
quarters of the interest groups he surveyed either regularly, very
frequently, or always had informal communications with agency
staff before and after the agency proposed a regulation that affect-
ed the group.3' The alternative to negotiated rulemaking is cer-
329. Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking 25 (Apr. 17, 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
330. Cf. Coglianese, supra note 21, at 748-51 (discussing the ongoing relationships that
develop in the regulatory process).
331. See, eg., Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE
NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 87 (Anthony King ed., 1978); Errol Meidinger, Reg-
ulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAw & POL'Y 355 (1987); PAUL J. QUIRK, IN-
DUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. So. 3 (1971).
332. See KERwIN, supra note 18, at 202. Scott Furlong found a similar pattern in his
study of interest group involvement in the regulatory process. See Scott Furlong, Interest
Group Influence on Regulatory Policy 126-27 (Dec. 9, 1992) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, American University) (on file with author) (reporting that three-fourths of the
groups surveyed used informal contact with agency staff as their method of participation
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tainly not, and never has been, an agency that completely locks
itself up in a room to settle on a rule. Indeed, the term "conven-
tional" rulemaking is itself a misnomer because agencies use a
wide array of procedures short of negotiated rulemaking for in-
volving the public in the rulemaking process.333
The failure of negotiated rulemaking-with its quest for con-
sensus-by no means implies a failure of negotiation in the regula-
tory process. Negotiated rulemaking shows weak results in large
part because of the strength of agencies in using less intensive
methods of negotiation and public input in the context of conven-
tional rulemaking. These methods, which include individual meet-
ings, public hearings, and ongoing advisory committees, provide
agencies with information about technical aspects of regulation as
well as the interests of affected parties.
The aggregation of interests has sometimes been considered a
primary purpose of administrative law.3" Negotiated rulemaking
has specifically been presented as an optimal means for revealing
interests because participants can make tradeoffs on various is-
sues.335 While formal negotiation does allow for tradeoffs, it by
no means guarantees against bluffing and posturing. Since negoti-
ated rulemaking encourages a give-and-take mentality among its
participants, representatives on negotiated rulemaking committees
have little incentive not to take positions on issues that they might
otherwise consider minor in conventional rulemaking. In contrast,
conventional rulemaking can provide agencies with clearer infor-
mation about the intensities of various groups' interests.336 Con-
ventional rulemaking allows organizations to participate as actively
in agency rulemaking more than 50 percent of the time). The preliminary results from
the second phase of the study by Cornelius Kerwin and Laura Langbein further support
this pattern. See Kerwin & Langbein, supra note 92, at 24 (finding conventional
rulemaking "as equally receptive and responsive to public involvement" as negotiated
rulemaking).
333. See, eg., KERWvN, supra note 18, at 171-73 (discussing "diversification" in the
forms of rulemaking participation); KEYSTONE CENTER, DISCUSSION ON THE USE OF
CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING PROCESSES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CLEAN
AIR ACr OF 1990 3 (1992), reprinted in 1995 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 48, 50
(outlining a "Spectrum of Consultation and Consensus-Building Approaches").
334. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
335. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 21, at 476 (arguing that negotiated rulemaking af-
fords participants an opportunity to rank issues and make tradeoffs).
336. Cf. RiCHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 3, 7, 237 (1996) (discussing
the role of revealed intensities in legislative politics).
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or inactively as they like.337 Their level of participation, taking
into account the organization's budgetary constraints, gives the
agency additional information about the importance of the rule to
the organization, information that can get truncated when an en-
tire rulemaking proceeds by committee.
Negotiated rulemaking has long been regarded as necessary to
avoid litigation and conflict.338 My analysis shows that this is not
the case. Litigation is not the inevitable product of agency
rulemaking. Many agencies, after all, do not face much conflict
between interest groups.339 Among those agencies that do face
conflicting interest groups, public managers appear much more
adept than ordinarily assumed at anticipating interests and man-
aging conflict in the normal rulemaking process.3'4
When conventional rulemaking works better than we thought
and negotiated rulemaking fares worse, there seems little reason to
continue to pursue negotiated rulemaking. Of course, it may be
argued that even if negotiated rulemaking fails to reduce time and
litigation, it still allows participants to learn from each other. 4'
It would not be surprising if negotiated rulemaking did foster
337. Since conventional rulemaking is not organized around a series of fixed meetings
with the agency, affected groups can decide how much effort to put into drafting com-
ments, contacting agency officials, mobilizing supporters in Congress, and building coali-
tions.
338. See supra notes 26-61 and accompanying text.
339. See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLMCS OF REGULA-
TION 357, 365 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); JOHN E. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND
THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY 78 (1983). As a staff member of a fi-
nancial regulatory agency said to me in a background interview, "We simply don't have
any adverse groups. It's just the securities industry ... and there's usually not much
opposition."
340. For example, among the 36 significant hazardous waste rules that EPA issued
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act from 1988 to 1991, both environ-
mental and industry groups filed comments in only 53 percent. In nearly half the cases,
EPA apparently succeeded in avoiding conflict between at least these two kinds of
groups.
341. See KERwiN & LANGBEIN, supra note 89, at 13 ("Participants generally report
that they learned a great deal during the course of a negotiated rulemaking."). Similar,
though somewhat more mixed, findings emerged from the second phase of the Kerwin
and Langbein study. Compared to participants in conventional rulemakings, participants in
negotiated rulemakings were more likely to report that they learned something about
scientific and technical issues, the positions of other participants, and how to negotiate.
See Kerwin & Langbein, supra note 92, at 14, tbl.8. On the other hand, a significantly
larger portion of participants in conventional rulemakings than in negotiated rulemakings
learned something about the rule, the law, EPA, or "other" issues related to the
rulemaking. See id.
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learning. After all, anyone who participates in a series of intensive
sessions focused on a regulation typically will come away having
learned more than if he had not attended at all.342 Participants
devote a substantial amount of their time and resources to
studying the issues." Kerwin and Langbein find that during ne-
gotiations organizations spend an average of 26 percent of all their
available resources on the negotiations, with environmental groups
reporting the highest proportion (50%).3' Kerwin and Langbein
also report that "big business" spends an average of $432,000 for
research expenses and over $250,000 for consultants and law-
yers.345 With investments as large as these, we should hope that
participants are learning something.
Yet since negotiated rulemaking is characterized by a quest
for consensus, we should ask whether learning depends on that
quest. In other words, do we need negotiated rulemaking for
learning to take place? Or can it be equally well achieved with
discussion-oriented sessions that do not seek the achievement of a
consensus? To show that learning and information exchange result
from a quest for consensus, we would need to compare negotiated
rulemaking with other equally intensive agency workshops. Pro-
ceedings that negotiation consultants like to call "facilitated joint
brainstorming, '' 3' and which agencies call roundtables, work-
shops, and "enhanced participatory rulemakings,, 347 also aim at
342. Of course, the information participants learn may still not be adequate, unbiased,
or equally understood. See Polkinghom, supra note 88, at 29 (citing limitations in the
learning potential of negotiated rulemaking).
343. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
344. See KERWIN & LANGBEIN, supra note 89, at 36.
345. See id.; see also supra note 317 and accompanying text (illustrating negotiated
rulemaking's demand on the time and financial resources of all participants). These re-
source commitments should be compared with the cost of challenging a major EPA rule,
which typically amounts to $150,000 to $250,000 for industry groups. See Coglianese, su-
pra note 193, at 112; American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 72 F. 3d 907, 910 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
346. See, e.g., Roger Fisher & Landrum Boling, Facilitated Joint Brainstorming, CMG
UPDATE, Spring 1995, at 3; see also Lawrence Susskind et al., Parallel Informal Negotia-
tion: A New Kind of International Dialogue, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 19, 20 (1996).
347. See The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1995: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Government Management and the District of Columbia of the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 161 (1996) (enclosure to letter from Shirley Ann
Jackson, Chair, Nuclear Regulatory Commission) (noting that the objective of an "en-
hanced participatory rulemaking" is to provide stakeholders with "an early opportunity to
discuss actively the rulemaking issues, as opposed to the objective of attempting to reach
a consensus on how those issues should be addressed, as is the case with a negotiated
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information exchange and learning, but without the quest for con-
sensus. Such proceedings may well achieve comparable gains in
terms of information exchange without generating the same level
of position-taking as negotiated rulemaking and without raising un-
realistic expectations about what participants will receive from
their investment of time.
The quest for consensus has been the hallmark of negotiated
rulemaking. In Philip Harter's words, "it is precisely the ability to
reach closure on critical issues that separates it from a mere ad-
visory committee or other consultative process."3" Through the
difficult task of finding and maintaining a consensus, negotiated
rulemaking offers agencies the hope of closure, reduced
rulemaking time, and lessened litigation. Yet in the negotiated
rulemakings that agencies have thus far completed, closure has
been more difficult to sustain than ever anticipated. Despite the
many aspirations for negotiated rulemaking, agencies' investment
in it has yet to yield any demonstrable dividends in terms of sav-
ing time or reducing litigation. The quest for consensus has
produced less closure than has the more practiced style of
rulemaking on which agencies ordinarily rely.
CONCLUSION
Negotiated rulemaking's promise has been an alluring one.
Poicymakers and scholars have increasingly looked to negotiated
rulemaking to minimize delays and conflict in the regulatory pro-
cess. In exchange for an up-front investment in the pursuit of con-
sensus early in the rulemaking process, agencies have been prom-
ised attractive dividends, namely shortened rulemaking time and
reduced litigation over agency rules. Advocates have claimed other
benefits from negotiated rulemaking, sometimes seeming to offer
the potential for creating nearly flawless regulations if only
agencies would affirm decisions reached by interest group repre-
sentatives. Yet these other purported benefits of negotiated
rulemaking-among them better information, shared learning, or
heightened feelings of community-have over the years been side
attractions to the main event, as they do not depend on a quest
for consensus. Policymakers and scholars have focused most of
rulemaking.").
348. Harter, supra note 102, at 13.
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their attention on negotiated rulemaking's potential to reduce
litigation and shorten rulemaking time, benefits that necessarily
depend on the successful maintenance of consensus.
Although this quest for consensus has held out the promise of
a faster and less conflictual regulatory process, experience has so
far shown otherwise. Negotiated rulemaking does not appear any
more capable of limiting regulatory time or avoiding litigation
than do the rulemaking procedures ordinarily used by agencies.
The agency that has used negotiated rulemaking the most, the
EPA, has not seen its negotiated rules emerge in final form any
sooner than rules not subject to formal negotiation. Once promul-
gated, negotiated rules still find themselves subject to legal chal-
lenge. The litigation rate for negotiated rules issued by the EPA
has actually been higher than that for other significant EPA rules.
These results will no doubt seem surprising in light of the enthusi-
astic support negotiated rulemaking has received over the years.
They are only all the more surprising considering that agencies
have deliberately selected rules for formal negotiation in order to
ensure the procedure's success.
On reflection, negotiated rulemaking's weak results should not
be as surprising as they may at first seem. While negotiated
rulemaking seeks to eliminate conflict, it also adds new sources of
conflict and raises unrealistic expectations about what participants
can gain from their participation. To meet negotiated rulemaking's
instrumental goals, agencies must secure and maintain a consensus,
something which is not easy to sustain throughout the entire regu-
latory process. The multiple avenues of input and oversight in the
regulatory process increase the likelihood of policy changes that
depart from an early agreement made by a select group of negoti-
ators. Despite these multiple avenues of influence in the regulato-
ry process (or perhaps in part because of them), agencies are
ordinarily more effective in crafting rules that avoid litigation
without formal negotiation. Agency staff members appear better
capable of avoiding litigation when they use the input provided in
conventional rulemaking to listen to competing views, balance
concerns, and make their best decisions.
The analysis provided in this Article shows that negotiated
rulemaking has not lived up to its promising potential to save
regulatory time or prevent litigation. From this perspective, it is
understandable that agencies have so infrequently relied on nego-
tiated rulemaking and it is inadvisable that Congress and the Pres-
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ident would direct agencies to do otherwise. As has long been
recognized, negotiated rulemaking demands a considerable invest-
ment of time, resources, and energy from all who participate in
the process. Such investments might once have been thought
sound in light of the benefits promised from a speedier, less con-
tested regulatory process. In the absence of these promised bene-
fits, agencies' continued reliance on public participation methods
which do not depend on consensus would appear the more sensi-
ble approach to making regulatory decisions.
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APPENDIX A:
Abandoned Negotiated Rulemakings
Surface Mining, Coal Refuse Disposal, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,858 (1995)
(Department of Interior).
Borrower Defense Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 11,004 (1995) (Depa-
rtment of Education).
Electronic Filing of Tariffs, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,164 (1994) (Interstate
Commerce Commission).
Mobile Satellite Service in the Frequency Bands Above 1 GHz, 57
Fed. Reg. 39,661 (1993) (Federal Communications Commis-
sion).
Ex Parte Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,863 (1991) (Department of
Energy).
Underground Injection Control, Class II Wells, 56 Fed. Reg. 4957
(1991) (Environmental Protection Agency).
NOx Emissions Reduction Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,348 (1991)
(Environmental Protection Agency).
Recycling of Lead Acid Batteries, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,884 (1990)
(Environmental Protection Agency).
Paleontology, Fossil Collection on Federal Lands, 54 Fed. Reg.
48,647 (1989) (Department of Interior).
Interstate Spread of Varroa Mites, 53 Fed. Reg. 45,134 (1988)
(Department of Agriculture).
Indemnity Agreements with Radiopharmaceutical Licensees, 53
Fed. Reg. 40,233 (1988) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 51 Fed. Reg. 5205 (1986)
(Federal Trade Commission).
Air Quality Regulations for Oil and Gas Operations Offshore
California, 51 Fed. Reg. 38,472, 38,520 (1986) (Department of
Interior).
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APPENDIX B:
Pending Negotiated Rulemakings
Motor Carrier Financial and Operating Data Collection Program,
61 Fed. Reg. 64,849 (1996) (Department of Transportation).
Qualification of Pipeline Personnel, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,410 (1996)
(Department of Transportation).
Safety Standards Fire Protection in Shipyard Employment, 61 Fed.
Reg. 28,824 (1996) (Department of Labor).
Commercial Driver Physical Qualifications, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,338
(1996) (Department of Transportation).
Accessibility Guidelines for Play Facilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,538
(1995) (Architectural & Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board).
Mortgage Broker Fee Disclosure Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 47,650 (1995)
(Department of Housing & Urban Development).
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, 60 Fed. Reg.
45,388 (1995) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment, 60 Fed.
Reg. 30,506 (1995) (Department of Transportation).
Marine Mammals, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,049 (1995) (Department of
Agriculture).
Cape Cod National Seashore Off-Road Vehicle Use, 60 Fed. Reg.
26,857 (1995) (Department of Interior).
Joint Tribal and Federal Self-Governance, 60 Fed. Reg. 8806
(1995) (Department of Interior).
Indian Gas Valuation, 60 Fed. Reg. 6977 (1995) (Department of
Interior).
Revisions of Wage Index for Medicare Reimbursement of Hospice
Services, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,129 (1994) (Department of Health &
Human Services).
Federal Gas Valuation, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,304 (1994) (Department of
Interior).
Local Multipoint Distribution Service and Fixed Satellite Service,
59 Fed. Reg. 7964 (1994) (Federal Communications Commis-
sion).
Small Nonroad Engines, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,061 (1993) (Environmen-
tal Protection Agency).
Safety Standards for Erection of Steel Structures, 57 Fed. Reg.
1338 [Vol, 46:1255
1997] ASSESSING CONSENSUS 1339
61,860 (1992) (Department of Labor).
Hazardous Waste Manifests, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,765 (1992) (Environ-
mental Protection Agency).
Architectural and Industrial Maintenance Coatings, 57 Fed. Reg.
1443 (1992) (Environmental Protection Agency).
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APPENDIX C:
Final Negotiated Rulemakings
Roadway Worker Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,959 (1996) (Depart-
ment of Transportation).
Reportable Events, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,988 (1996) (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation).
Hearing Aid Compatible Telephones, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,181 (1996)
(Federal Communications Commission).
Indian Self-Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 32,482 (1996) (Depart-
ment of the Interior & Department of Health & Human
Services).
Disinfectant Byproducts in Drinking Water (Information Collection
Rule), 61 Fed. Reg. 24,354 (1996) (Environmental Protection
Agency).
Operating Subsidies for Vacant Public Housing Units, 61 Fed.
Reg. 7586 (1996) (Department of Housing & Urban Develop-
ment).
Oil Spill Vessel Response Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 1052 (1996) (De-
partment of Transportation).
Wood Furniture Manufacturing Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,930
(1995) (Environmental Protection Agency).
Drawbridge Operations, Chicago River, IL, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,298
(1995) (Department of Transportation).
Helping Disadvantaged Children Meet High Standards, 60 Fed.
Reg. 34,800 (1995) (Department of Education).
Direct Student Loan Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,664 (1994) (De-
partment of Education).
Guaranty Agency Reserves Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,688
(1994) (Department of Education).
Higher Education Amendments of 1992, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,348
(1994) (Department of Education).
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Organic Chemicals/Control of Volatile Organic Chemical
Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (1994) (Environmental
Protection Agency).
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7716 (1994) (Environmental Protection Agency).
Provision of Nonvoice Low Earth Orbit Satellite Services, 58 Fed.
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Reg. 68,053 (1993) (Federal Communications Commission).
National Emissions Standards for Coke Oven Batteries, 58 Fed.
Reg. 57,898 (1993) (Environmental Protection Agency).
Assessment and Apportionment of Administrative Expenses, 58
Fed. Reg. 10,939 (1993) (Farm Credit Administration).
Scrapie Indemnification, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,130 (1992) (Department
of Agriculture).
Worker Protection Standard for Agricultural Pesticides, 57 Fed.
Reg. 38,102 (1992) (Environmental Protection Agency).
State Vocational and Applied Technology Education Programs, 57
Fed. Reg. 36,720 (1992) (Department of Education).
Occupational Exposure to 4, 4' Methylenedianiline, 57 Fed. Reg.
35,630 (1992) (Department of Labor).
Transportation for Individuals With Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
45,584 (1991) (Department of Transportation).
Uniform System for Handicapped Parking, 56 Fed. Reg. 10,328
(1991) (Department of Transportation).
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Air Travel, 55 Fed.
Reg. 8008 (1990) (Department of Transportation).
Financial Assistance to Meet Special Educational Needs of Chil-
dren, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,752 (1989) (Department of Education).
Submission and Management of Records and Documents Related
to the Licensing of a High-Level Radioactive Waste Deposi-
tory, 54 Fed. Reg. 14,925 (1989) (Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission).
Permit Modifications for Hazardous Waste Management Facilities,
53 Fed. Reg. 37,912 (1988) (Environmental Protection Agen-
cy).
Underground Injection of Hazardous Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,118
(1988) (Environmental Protection Agency).
New Source Performance Standards for Residential Wood Heaters,
53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1988) (Environmental Protection Agency).
Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826
(1987) (Environmental Protection Agency).
Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 (1987)
(Department of Labor).
Emergency Pesticide Exemptions, 51 Fed. Reg. 1896 (1986) (Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency).
Nonconformance Penalties for Heavy-Duty Engines and Heavy-
Duty Vehicles Under Clean Air Act, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,374
(1985) (Environmental Protection Agency).
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Flight Time Limitations and Rest Requirements, 50 Fed. Reg.
29,306 (1985) (Federal Aviation Administration).
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APPENDIX D:
Selected References to the Apocryphal
80% Litigation Rate for EPA Rules
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTI-
ATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK xv (David M. Pritzker &
Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1990) ("All too frequently, govern-
ment agencies and the public find that agency issuance of a
final rule... is simply the opening round in the inevitable
courtroom litigation to follow .... [O]ne agency resulted in
some 80% of all rules being challenged in court.").
Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise
and the Pitfalls, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S
211, 216 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990) ("It
has been estimated that 80 percent of environmental regulato-
ry decisions are appealed in court, either by industries that
believe the rules are too stringent or by environmental groups
that believe them to be too lax." (footnote omitted)).
Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, You Can't Get There From He-
re, FORBES, July 6, 1992, at 59 ("[O]f every five major deci-
sions made by [EPA Administrator William K.] Reilly, four
are litigated.").
GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN
AIR Act OF 1990 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 211 (1995)
("[V]irtually every major EPA regulation has been challenged
in federal courts.").
GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLI-
CY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 117 (1987) ("For-
mer administrator William Ruckelshaus estimated that 80
percent of all rules issued by the EPA were subsequently
challenged in federal courts . . ").
CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECH., & GOV'T, RISK AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING
109 (1993) ("In some agencies, 80 percent of major rules are
appealed.").
Don R. Clay, New Environmentalism: A Cooperative Strategy, F.
FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL., Spring 1993, at 125, 126
("Currently, four out of five EPA decisions are challenged in
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court. Consensus-building should reduce the number of cases
that go to court.").
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY 3 (1985) ("Fully 85 percent of EPA's regu-
lations result in litigation.").
Cynthia Croce, Negotiation Instead of Confrontation, EPA J., Apr.
1985, at 23, 23 ("80 percent of the time, EPA's final rules are
challenged in court!").
J. Patrick Dobel, Managerial Leadership in Divided Times: William
Ruckelshaus and the Paradoxes of Independence, 26 ADMIN. &
Soc'Y 488, 492 (1995) ("More than 80% of all environmental
regulations end up in court." (citation omitted)).
John P. Dwyer, Contentiousness and Cooperation in Environmental
Regulation, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 809 n.1, 819 (1987)
("80% of EPA's regulations are challenged in court [and]
most parties ... challenge virtually every regulation in order
to preserve their rights.").
Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated
Rulemaking at EPA, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 29, 29
(1985) ("As many as 80% of EPA's final rules are chal-
lenged.., often by both sides of an issue.").
DANIEL J. FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 56 (1995)
("A near certainty for most important final rules is a court
challenge.").
Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Co-
urts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 249 n.2 ("[O]ver 80% of EPA's
regulations are challenged in court.").
WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAY-
AL OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 110 (1992) ("[Ruckelshaus]
asked the [EPA] general counsel to study it and he found
that 85 percent of the decisions made by the EPA administra-
tor that are appealable were appealed.").
MICHAEL GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AME-
RICAN LAW 92 (1996) ("At any given time, some 80 percent
of the EPA's rulemaking proceedings are tied up in litiga-
tion.").
KATHRYN HARRISON & GEORGE HOBERG, RISK, SCIENCE & P0-
LITICS 13 (1994) ("80 percent of the Environmental Protection
Agency's regulations have ended up in court.").
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GEORGE HOBERG, PLURALISM BY DESIGN: ENVIRONMENTAL PO-
LICY AND THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 199 (1992)
("By one count, fully 80% of EPA's final decisions are the
subject of judicial appeal." (citation omitted)).
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW
IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 87 (1994) ("[M]ost decisions are
appealed in the courts, including 80 percent of the EPA's de-
cisions . . ").
Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Governme-
nt, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 371 (1991) ("An ad-
ministrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency esti-
mated that more than 80 percent of EPA's regulations have
been challenged in court.").
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGE-
NCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 264 (1994) ("85 per-
cent of the hundreds of nonroutine rules issued by the EPA
each year are challenged in court.").
Chris Kirtz, Environmental Protection Agency's Regulatory Negoti-
ation Project, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. REP., May 1985, at 9, 9
("As many as 80 percent of the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's regulations are challenged in court.").
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